AN

Extract from a Reply

TO THE

OBSERVATIONS

OF

Lieut. Gen. Sir WILLIAM HOWE,

ON A PAMPHLET, ENTITLED

LETTERS TO A NOBLEMAN.

LONDON:

Printed by J. PARAMORE, *Foundry, Upper-Moorfields:*

And sold at the Rev. Mr. Wesley's New Chapel, in the City Road;

and at all his Preaching-Houses in Town and Country. 1781.

AN

EXTRACT from a REPLY

TO

Sir William Howe's Obſervations, &c.

WHEN a man, conſcious of his own miſconduct, finds himſelf under the neceſſity of miſrepreſenting notorious facts, and even of deſcending to perſonal detraction, for his own vindication, he is to be pitied. This appears to be the caſe of Sir William. If the Author of the "Letters to a Nobleman" has contributed to his diſtreſs, he has done it with reluctance, from a ſenſe of duty to the public, and not from any impulſe of private reſentment; for he frankly declares, he never had any cauſe of perſonal enmity to Sir William Howe; therefore, the motives which led him to publiſh his ſtrictures on the American war, could not ariſe from ſuch a principle.

Nor was the examination of the management of the American war needleſsly undertaken. The unparalleled failures in that war, the uncommon magnitude of the evils in which they had involved the nation, with the reluctance of Government to make judicial enquiry into the cauſes of them, loudly called for it.

We had ſeen the General, in the Middle Colonies, commanding a force, commonly four times, and at certain periods eight times, greater than that of his enemy; a force ſo adequate to the purpoſes for which it was intended, that he could not help expreſſing his "utter amazement" on the occaſion, and paying to the Secretary of State of the American department the greateſt encomium, for his "uncommon exertions." To this was added a naval force of eighty veſſels of war, under the command of his Noble Brother, to co-operate with him in ſubduing the moſt unjuſtifiable rebellion *that ever happened in any country.*

We had ſeen him, between the 3d of September and the 8th of December, driving that enemy before him from Long Iſland, over the North River, and the Delaware, reducing his army from 18,000 to 3000 men, and taking from him *the whole province of New Jerſey.*

But ſuch was the reverſe of conduct, ſuch the dereliction of military virtue, that he ſuffered that reduced, panic-ſtruck enemy to ſurpriſe his advanced poſt, and drive him out of Weſt Jerſey, and to reconquer all Eaſt Jerſey, except his three poſts on the Rariton; and, in the neighbourhood of his head-quarters, to beſiege, haraſs, and diſtreſs the whole Britiſh army, from December to June, *without making one attempt to diſlodge him.*

We had ſeen him, having under his command at New-York 30,000 men, marching out againſt this enemy, who, by his own exaggerated account, had no more than 10,000, new-raiſed and undiſciplined; and, a few days after, retreating before him from Hillſborough to Amboy, without taking any *one proper ſtep to bring him to an engagement.*

We had ſeen him, after this diſgraceful retreat, embarking his army on ſhip-board, at an immenſe expence: and forewarned of the difficulties and dangers he muſt encounter on the ocean, proceeding, againſt contrary winds, 700 miles, to meet the ſame enemy poſted on ſtronger ground, and enabling him

him, by this waſte of time, to procure *near double his former numbers.*

We had ſeen him, contrary to the plaineſt dictates of military ſcience, and the explicit orders of his Sovereign, lead his force 600 miles from the place where he was directed to join General Burgoyne, and at the very time when that junction was to have been made; and by this conduct *ſacrifice a whole Britiſh army.*

We had ſeen him at Brandywine, by the moſt ſpirited manœuvres, ſurround and hem in, between the two columns of his own force and impaſſable waters, the whole rebel army, vigorouſly attack, and ſuddenly defeat it; and yet, he ſuffered the defeated remains to lie a whole night at Cheſter, within eight miles of his camp, *and on the next morning to eſcape unmoleſted.*

We had ſeen him at Goſhen a few days after, when his enemy, with his reduced force, had incautiouſly advanced near the van of his army, after one of his columns had actually engaged with the rebel advanced guard, intimidated from his intended attack by a fall of *rain*, although that circumſtance was much more favourable to his own regular troops than to the undiſciplined troops of his enemy; and although *that enemy had a conſiderable river in its rear.*

We had ſeen him at Germantown ſuffer himſelf to be ſurpriſed, his advanced poſts defeated and driven back upon the main body of his army, and that army in imminent danger of a total rout *by an inferior undiſciplined enemy.*

We had ſeen him, when the rebel force lay at White Marſh, and when he had the beſt information of its poſition and ſtrength, march out of his lines under a pretence of attacking it; and yet, after lying three days within two miles of it, return, without attempting to bring it to action, either by aſſault, or turning its right flank or rear: in either of which caſes he muſt have cut his enemy off from his ſupplies, and placed him in a ſituation from whence *he could not have eſcaped without ruin.*

We had alſo ſeen the General, after he had proved his force in every action ſuperior to that of his enemy, ſuffer his whole army to be beſieged in Philadelphia, from the month of November to the month of June, *by a feeble, ſickly, naked, and half-ſtarved army, of leſs than* 4000 *effective men.*

But further.—We had ſeen the ſame General, with a vanity unparalleled in hiſtory, after all theſe wretched blunders, accept, from a few of his officers, a triumph more magnificent than would have become the conqueror of America: and that at the time when the news of a war with France had juſt arrived, and in the very city, the capital of North America, the late ſeat of the Congreſs, which was in a few days to be delivered up to that Congreſs!

Such was the diſgraceful conduct of the General, and ſuch the misfortunes which he had brought on his country! And yet, had he contented himſelf with the honours he had received from this mockery of a triumph, the "Letters to a Nobleman" would never have appeared. But when the Author ſaw the General and his Noble Brother, ſupported by a dangerous faction, purſuing meaſures which he conceived tended to involve his country in diſgrace and ruin; when he ſaw them, in order to conceal their own miſconduct, attempting to perſuade the great repreſentative body of the nation, that America was "the ſtrongeſt country in the world," and impracticable in war; that the people were univerſally diſloyal: that the immenſe naval and military force committed to their command was incompetent to the reduction of the rebellion—in order to prevail on the nation to give up the greateſt part of its dominions; a diſintereſted regard for the welfare of his country, and an honeſt indignation at ſo flagitious an attempt, called on him to lay before his fellow-ſubjects a true ſtate of the matters thus miſrepreſented. And he declares, that the Letters were wrote without the ſolicitation or knowledge of any perſon whatever in the adminiſtration of Government.

Had

Had the General, by a true ſtate of facts, and by candid argument, convinced me that I was wrong; ever happy to acquit injured innocence, there is no act of juſtice, which my honour would not induce me to perform; but as the reverſe is the caſe, the ſame motives which influenced me to write the Letters, oblige me to vindicate the truths they contain.

In my firſt letter, "On the Strength and Practicability of the Middle Colonies in reſpect to military Operations," in order to refute what the General had attempted to prove, that this part of America was the "ſtrongeſt of all countries in the world," I have given a true deſcription of that country, ſupported by the evidence of General Robertſon, who had reſided in it many years, and which can be ſupported by many gentlemen, now in England: and I had further made a compariſon between it and the ſcene of action in the laſt American war, ſhewing that the latter was infinitely more difficult than the former. To evade the force of theſe truths, the General obſerves,

Narrative, p. 37.] "*That the two laſt wars, with reſpect to the ſtate of the country of America, are in no degree ſimilar. In the laſt war, the difficulties ariſing from the ſtrength of the country, were, for the moſt part, removed by the friendly diſpoſition of the inhabitants, who all exerted themſelves to facilitate the operations of the King's army, and to ſupply them with every neceſſary and accommodation.*"

What theſe "neceſſaries and accommodations" were, which were thus furniſhed in the laſt war, and which the General could not procure, is not mentioned. That the inhabitants furniſhed General Braddock in his expedition to the Ohio, Colonel Bouquet in his expedition to Muſkingum, far beyond the Ohio, and Sir Jeffery Amherſt in his expedition to Montreal, with carriages and proviſions, is true—and with nothing elſe—They wanted nothing elſe. But Sir William Howe did not even want all theſe.—He tranſported carriages with him

from

from England, and whatever more he wanted were procured on Long Iſland and Staten Iſland. Large fleets of proviſions were conſtantly ſent to him; and in every part of the country, where his army marched, he procured a ſupply without difficulty. At Bordentown, Captain Gamble was forming a large magazine of proviſions, voluntarily brought in by the inhabitants when Trenton was taken: and the whole army was ſupplied, during two months, in its march from the Elk to Philadelphia, with more proviſions than it could conſume: and there was nothing which the country produced, either of neceſſaries or delicacies, during the nine months it remained in Philadelphia, with which it was not furniſhed by the inhabitants.

What then were the advantages which the Generals in the laſt war poſſeſſed, that were not to be commanded in the preſent? There were none. But they had diſadvantages and difficulties, infinitely greater to encounter, which their gallantry eaſily overcame. The General's operations were carried on in the Middle Colonies, where every neceſſary was eaſily obtained; but the expedition of Sir Jeffery Amherſt led him to paſs from Albany, by Lake Ontario, to Montreal, near 300 miles, carrying his proviſions either through a wilderneſs or an enemy's country, over lakes, mountains, and ſwamps; and the operations of General Forbes, and Colonel Bouquet led them through a wilderneſs inhabited only by Indians, where no ſingle article of proviſions of any kind was to be procured; the firſt to Fort du Queſne, and the other far beyond it, down to Muſkingum: and yet we have found that theſe gallant men, in whoſe hearts the honour of their Sovereign and the ſervice of their country were deeply impreſſed, were not obſtructed or intimidated by theſe difficulties.

To refute my aſſertion, that "the ſtrength and impracticability of the Middle Colonies is loſt in idea, when we compare them with the ſcene of action in the laſt war," the General adduces the teſtimony of Major-general Grey, who ſays,

Page 38.] "*That part of America where I have been, is the ſtrongeſt country I have ever been in;* it is *every where* HILLY *and* COVERED WITH WOOD, *interſected* by ravines, and creeks, and marſhy grounds; and *in* EVERY QUARTER OF A MILE *is a poſt fitted for* AMBUSCADE." And in his anſwer to another queſtion, he adds, "That America is, of all countries, the beſt calculated for the defenſive; *every hundred yards* might be diſputed; at leaſt that part of it which I have ſeen."

This is a formidable deſcription of the Middle Colonies, but it is truly viſionary. What countries the Major-general alludes to, I know not; and yet to prove that he is miſtaken in his facts, will be no arduous taſk. He has ſeen the plains on Long Iſland, of thirty miles in length, and from ſeven to twelve in breadth, which are without wood, or a ſingle obſtruction that can give one enemy the advantage over another. He has alſo ſeen the country between New-York and Trenton, and between the head of Elk and Philadelphia, in which there is not a hill but what may be either aſcended without difficulty, or avoided by an army in its march. When theſe hills are compared with thoſe of this country, they are by no means ſo high, ſo ſteep, or ſo difficult of acceſs; but when we compare them with the country from Albany to Montreal, and with Conigocheague Ridge, Sideling Hill, Ray's Hill, the Allegheny and Laurel ridge of mountains, which may be juſtly ſtyled the American Alps, they are little more than mole-hills; and yet theſe mountains, though full of ravines and dangerous defiles, and although covered with wood, and poſſeſſed by an enemy whoſe talent in war is *ambuſcade*, did not intimidate the bravery, nor obſtruct the march, of an Amherſt, a Forbes, or a Bouquet; they ſaw them with contempt, and paſſed them in deſpite of their oppoſing enemy.

If the country which the General has ſeen is *every where covered with wood*, where do thoſe immenſe quantities of wheat, rye, barley, Indian-corn, oats,

oats, and buck-wheat, which furniſh the inhabitants with food, and are exported to Europe, find room to grow? Is it poſſible that a country, ſettled one hundred years, and having ſo many hundred thouſands of induſtrious inhabitants, can in any degree bear this deſcription, and remain to this day a wilderneſs? I imagine not. The real truth is, that the provinces of New Jerſey and Pennſylvania, where the late operations were carried on, are ſettled, and full of plantations, and at leaſt two-thirds, and in many places five-ſixth parts of them cleared of wood; and the wood conſiſts of large trees, ſtanding at conſiderable diſtances, free from underwood, and eaſily ſcoured with cannon. As to the "ravines," they muſt be in proportion to the hills which I have deſcribed. The "creeks," or rivulets, are all fordable, or may be paſſed by marching a few miles round; and there are no "marſhes" or fenny grounds within the country. This ground, when cleared, is meadow, and of ſix times the value of upland, and therefore the firſt improved. Theſe are all facts, well known to the people of that country, and which can be proved by many gentlemen now in London. How then can it be poſſible that this country can be, what the General aſſerts "the ſtrongeſt country in the world?"

"*I ſhall now proceed*, ſays the General, *with my remarks, page by page.*" I will do myſelf the honour of ſtrictly attending him.

In page 3, *of the Letters, I have aſſerted*, "That in this country we have lately ſeen two armies, one meditating its conqueſt, the other its defence. We have ſeen the Britiſh army penetrating into its heart, a circuit of near two hundred miles, from Long Iſland, by the *White Plains*, to Trenton, and from the Elk Ferry to Philadelphia, *in defiance of the utmoſt efforts* of an enemy perfectly acquainted with every advantageous ſpot of ground; and we have ſeen that army taking, with eaſe and little loſs, every ſtrong poſt poſſeſſed by the enemy, *who have fled at its approach.*"

Page

Page 89.] "*This deſcription,*" ſays the General, "*is introduced to prove that the country is not* VERY STRONG NOR IMPRACTICABLE; *but it only proves, that the Generals and officers, commanding the ſeveral corps, were indefatigable in their duty, and ſurmounted all the difficulties which they met with in thoſe marches.*

I am not enquiring into the conduct of the officers of the army; nor have I ever had any reaſon to do ſo. Whenever led on to action, their conduct has ſhewn that they were actuated by honour, and a love of their country; and I therefore acknowledge, that they were indefatigable (that is, not fatigued) in their duty, whenever called to it; becauſe I am confident that many, if not all, would have ſurmounted difficulties tenfold as great as any of thoſe to which they were led, and not think it a *fatigue*. In the whole tenor of my Letters, I have only cenſured the miſconduct of their Leader.

Ibid.] "*The Commander in Chief, however, will be ſuppoſed to have had ſome ſhare in the merit of theſe ſucceſſes.*"

I confeſs it. Whenever the General found himſelf either diſpoſed, or *under a neceſſity* of meditating a blow againſt the enemy, he never failed of ſucceſs. At Long Iſland and the White Plains, in the progreſs of the army to the Delaware, and at the Brandywine, he ſucceeded as far as he choſe: had he preſſed the advantage, he might have ended the rebellion. I have not cenſured the General for want of abilities; the blame in that caſe would fall on his employers. My ſtrictures are confined to his non-exertion of thoſe abilities which were demonſtrated on Long Iſland and the Brandywine, and that undaunted courage which was ſo apparent in the action at Bunker's Hill.

Ibid.] "*But it is not true that the enemy always fled at our approach, nor that we took all their ſtrong poſts with eaſe and little loſs.*"

Here the General takes advantage of the words "always fled," and applies them to all the conduct of the rebels in the general actions. A ſmall ſhare

of

of candour, or a little attention to the paragraph he cites, would have taught him, that I did not allude to the battles of Long Iſland, Fort Waſhington, or Brandywine. I had in the ſame paragraph declared, "that the Britiſh army had penetrated from Long Iſland, by the White Plains, to Trenton, *in defiance of the utmoſt efforts* of the enemy," including the very inſtances he mentions; and therefore he might have perceived, that the words "*always fled*" could only refer to thoſe *formidable unfortified* "*poſts*" which are to be found "*in every quarter of a mile*," and even in "*every one hundred yards*," in that country, the beſt of all other countries "*calculated for the defenſive.*" And here my expreſſion will be found ſtrictly true; for it is known that the rebels fled at the approach of the Royal army, at Newark, Brunſwick, Princeton, twice at Trenton, near Newport in Newcaſtle-county, and at Goſhen in Pennſylvania; at ſeveral of which places, had they been purſued by 5000 Britiſh, their army muſt have been utterly ruined.

Ibid.] "*Much might be ſaid upon the ſtate of loyalty in America.* SOME *are loyal from principle,* MANY *from intereſt,* MANY *from reſentment; and there are* OTHERS *who wiſh ſucceſs to Great Britain, from a recollection of the happineſs they enjoyed under her government.*"

I cannot help thanking the General for thi candid confeſſion reſpecting the loyalty of th people of America. It amounts to a full acknowledgement of all I have contended for in the Letter reſpecting it. The force of the facts I have alledged has, I truſt, extorted it from him—but, I apprehend unwarily; otherwiſe he would not have taken up near four pages to diſprove the facts adduced in ſupport of a truth he ſo fully confeſſes. The taſk of reconciling this confeſſion to his attempt, in the Houſe of Commons, to prove that the "Americans were almoſt univerſally diſloyal," I leave to thoſe who will undertake it.

I had ſaid, that ſome, who were high in office in America, in order to juſtify *the neglect and inhuman treatment which his Majeſty's faithful ſubjects had received*, and to throw a veil over that miſconduct which had waſted, unneceſſarily, many millions for the nation, ſacrificed its true intereſt, and loſt its honour, were the inventors of the report of the univerſal diſloyalty of the Americans. To this the General anſwers,

Page 39.] "*I am at a loſs to know what ſpecies of neglect and inhumanity is here meant; I am contented that ſtrictures ſhould be made upon my profeſſional conduct, but I feel myſelf hurt as a man when I am accuſed of inhumanity.*"

Ever pleaſed to do the General juſtice, I will relieve his feelings as a man; and I wiſh I could alſo relieve thoſe which he muſt experience as an officer. There is nothing in my Letters which charges him with doing *perſonally* a ſingle act of inhumanity. My ſtrictures were confined to his "profeſſional conduct;" and the ſubſequent part of my Letters explains what I mean by the inhuman treatment which his Majeſty's faithful ſubjects had received; and, as he has miſunderſtood me, I will again explain it. The inhuman treatment alluded to, was the indiſcriminate plunder ſuffered to be committed, by the ſoldiery under his command, on Staten Iſland, Long Iſland, the White Plains, and in the province of New Jerſey, where friend and foe, loyaliſt and rebel, met with the ſame fate; a ſeries of continued plunder, which was a diſgrace to an army pretending to diſcipline, and which, while it tended to relax the diſcipline of the troops, could not fail to create the greateſt averſion, even in the breaſt of loyalty itſelf, to a ſervice which, under the fair pretence of giving them protection, robbed them, in many inſtances, of even the neceſſaries of life.

In vain, I imagine, will the General plead, his orders and proclamations forbidding plunder. Laws, without execution, are but a dead letter; and

his orders, and proclamations, ſo often repeated, without puniſhing the atrocious offenders, were conſidered as blank paper; and the plundering continued as much after as before they were iſſued, until he paſſed into Pennſylvania, where, having made an example or two of the delinquents, the plunder in a great meaſure ceaſed. Had this miſchief been nipped in the bud by a few examples, which might have been eaſily done in an army ſo perfectly ſubmiſſive to diſcipline in every other reſpect as the Britiſh was, the relaxation in diſcipline which loſt Trenton, the impreſſions made on the minds of the Loyaliſts to the prejudice of the King's ſervice, and the diſgrace that was brought on the honour, juſtice, and humanity of Britain, could not have taken place.

To vindicate himſelf againſt this viſionary charge of perſonal inhumanity, he tells us, page 40, of his great humanity to the people of Boſton, and that "*it is upon record (Proclamation 28th October, 1775,) that their ſervices were courted, by recommending a defenſive aſſociation; and that arms were offered to all who would declare themſelves willing to contribute their aſſiſtance in the preſervation of good order and government within the town of Boſton.*"

What his behaviour was to the people of Boſton, they can beſt inform the public; the taſk I have aſſumed, is, only to enquire into his conduct in the Middle Colonies. Why, then, not tell us of his wiſe and prudent conduct there? Was it becauſe he is conſcious that it was not ſo wiſe and prudent? If this ſenſe of the matter did not prevail with him, it was impolitic to mention this proclamation; becauſe it only informs us, that he knew what ought to be done, and did it not. To draw aſſiſtance to the Britiſh force, wherever he operated, was moſt certainly his duty. If the Loyaliſts in Boſton were to be truſted, when aſſociated, with arms, men of the ſame principles were to be equally truſted in the provinces of New York, New Jerſey, and Pennſylvania, where they were more numerous.

Why

Why then was there not a like proclamation iſſued in any of theſe provinces? Had this been done, the ſalutary effects are obvious, from an indubitable fact. Since his reſignation, upwards of 5000 Loyaliſts are embodied in arms for the defence of New York. Had this been done, it would have enabled Sir H. Clinton to have led, inſtead of between two and three, at leaſt 8000 men, in a diverſion in favour of the Northern army; for Sir Henry did not leave more regulars, than the number of Loyaliſts, thus embodied, for the defence of New York, when he paſſed up the North river, and found himſelf too weak to proceed. Had this been done, he might, if he did not chooſe to ſupport the Northern army, have taken at leaſt 5000 men more with him to Pennſylvania; a number equal to Waſhington's whole force, the greater part of the time the two armies were in that province.

And had the like proclamation been iſſued in New Jerſey, when the General was at Trenton, and had driven Waſhington's enfeebled army, of 3000 men, and all the officers of the rebel State, out of the province; and when the General himſelf incautiouſly confeſſes, "that his ſucceſſes had intimidated the leaders of the rebellion, and nearly induced a general ſubmiſſion*," all thoſe men in New Jerſey, who were loyal "from principle, from intereſt, from reſentment, and from a recollection of the happineſs they enjoyed under the Britiſh government," would have aſſociated in arms, and formed a ſolid barrier of defence againſt every attempt of the rebels, except that of Waſhington's army.

And had the General iſſued the like proclamation, when in Philadelphia, he would have obtained a militia of 3500 men. Had he invited the people in the peninſula between the Delaware and Cheſapeak, to aſſociate, and aſſiſt him in arms; and had he, as he was requeſted, landed a few men to ſup-

* Narrative, p. 40.

port them, and to furniſh them with arms and ammunition; the 2000 Loyaliſts, who had aſſociated in leſs than three days, in three of the thirteen counties only, would have been immediately in arms on the part of Great-Britain; and no man, who is acquainted with the general loyalty of the people of that country, can doubt, but that their numbers would have increaſed, in a month, to 6000, if not 8000 men. Nothing could have been wanting to have carried this meaſure into complete effect, and to have reduced this peninſula to the peace of the Crown, but a ſmall poſt at Wilmington, to cover that country: becauſe, while that poſt remained, Waſhington could not, with any degree of prudence, truſt his army, or any part of it, in that peninſula. This would have been a ſnare into which the Britiſh General ought to have led him, and out of which he could not have extricated himſelf: he would in that caſe have been between the aſſociated Loyaliſts and the poſt at Wilmington, where the Britiſh army might have been tranſported by water in one, or have marched by land in two days, from Philadelphia. All theſe truths muſt, upon a ſlight view of the chart of that country, ſtrike the military eye with inſtantaneous conviction; and yet that encouragement which he boaſts of having publiſhed at Boſton, was in this country ſhamefully neglected.

The General acknowledges, that he found in Philadelphia 4482* male inhabitants capable of bearing arms. Of this number there were not fifty who had taken any part againſt the Britiſh government; the reſt, being about one eleventh part of the inhabitants, had fled; leſs than 1000 were Quakers: ſo that, had the General purſued the ſame wiſe meaſure in Philadelphia which he did at Boſton, and which General Knyphauſen afterwards purſued at New York; had he ſuffered the people to have choſen their own officers, and em-

* Narrative, p. 54.

bodied

bodied themſelves for the defence of the city; a militia of 3500 men, beſides the numerous refugees who attended him, would have formed an armed force, which with a few veſſels of war, and 1000 regular troops, would have been a ſufficient defence for that city againſt any force of the enemy, except Waſhington's army. This would have enabled him to have marched out with his whole force againſt Waſhington, while he remained from December to the middle of June with his reduced, ſickly, and half-ſtarved army at the Valley Forge, where that army might have been attacked in their weak intrenchments, or ſurrounded and beſieged, and reduced by famine in one week at fartheſt, and an end have been put to the rebellion.

Page 41 *is employed in entertaining the reader with the profuſe liberality of the General towards Mr. Galloway, and with ſome oblique general charges, ſtriking at his popularity and integrity.*

What either that Gentleman's popularity or integrity has to do with Sir William Howe's military conduct, the reader will be puzzled to diſcern. I ſhall not therefore *in this Reply*, undertake a vindication of Mr. Galloway's perſonal character. But, at the ſame time, I cannot help obſerving, that general charges againſt either a public or private character are little better than aſſaſſinations in the dark, againſt which the moſt perfect innocence has no chance of guarding itſelf. The charges againſt the General in my Letters are ſo particular, ſpecific, and defined, that he might, if he could, vindicate himſelf againſt them. But his honour, it ſeems, has not led him to deal thus honourably by Mr. Galloway.

In order to prove that many of the Pennſylvanians were attached to the Britiſh government, I have aſſerted, that during our poſſeſſion of Philadelphia, the people of the country, at the riſque of their lives, had ſupplied the Britiſh army, navy, and inhabitants, amounting to not leſs than 50,000 perſons, with all kinds of proviſions, while they

 refuſed

refuſed theſe ſupplies to the rebel General. Theſe facts Sir William Howe does not venture to deny. I thought, and ſtill think, they fully ſupport the matter I wiſhed to prove. In ſo great a conteſt, in the event of which, the intereſt and happineſs of mankind were ſo deeply involved, and their paſſions ſo violently engaged, neutrality of ſentiment or attachment is unprecedented—is impoſſible. Men's opinions and wiſhes will become fixed in favour of one ſide or the other; and I concluded, how reaſonably the Reader will determine, that thoſe men who voluntarily ſupplied Waſhington's army againſt their Sovereign, were *rebels*; and that thoſe who, every mile they paſſed, riſqued their lives, and yet at that riſque ſupplied the King's troops with proviſions, from five to an hundred miles diſtance, were friends and faithful ſubjects. But it ſeems the General is of a different opinion. ——Hear his arguments.

Page 42.] "*That the people of the country brought in freſh proviſions to us, and refuſed ſuch ſupplies, as much as they* DARED, *to the rebel General, is certain. But I do not admit, that this conduct proceeded from the motives aſcribed by the Author. The people of the country had no opinion of the value of Congreſs-money. They knew they ſhould receive moſtly hard money in payment; and they had an opportunity of carrying back with them a variety of neceſſary articles.—Theſe, I apprehend, were the real motives of all that aſſiſtance which we procured from the country-people.*"

What a horrid idea of human nature muſt the General have entertained when he drew theſe concluſions! Would not a little charity have convinced him, that men who were loyal "from principle—from reſentment,—from a recollection of former happineſs," and whoſe actions ſtrictly correſponded, were actuated by motives more honourable, than that of acquiring a little hard money and a few neceſſaries? Can it be poſſible that he could believe, that the honour of "principle," the powerful impulſes of juſt reſentment for injuries

ſuſtained,

ſuſtained, and a lively ſenſe of former "happineſs," of which they had been wantonly deprived, were all effaced by ſuch paltry conſiderations? Did he paſs this cruel judgment on the faithful ſubjects of his Sovereign, and the tried friends of his country, by his own feelings—the teſt of his own actions? Were the Loyaliſts, whom the General, after all the aſſiſtance they had given to him, has thus ungratefully traduced, to retaliate, with how much more reaſon might they ſay, That he had ſacrificed his military fame, his duty to his Sovereign and his fellow-ſubjects, and the intereſt and ſafety of his country, to the dirty purpoſes of a faction, whoſe whole conduct is founded on private intereſt and ambition!

Page 43.] "*The Author ſays, they did this* AT THE RISQUE OF THEIR LIVES. *There was in fact* THAT APPEARANCE; *but I* SUSPECTED *that General Waſhington, through policy, connived at this kind of commerce.*"

The argument here reſts upon the feeble ſupport of the General's "ſuſpicion," while he acknowledges that "appearance" was againſt that ſuſpicion. If appearance was againſt it, upon what was his ſuſpicion founded? It could not be upon facts; for in that caſe his opinion could not reſt in ſuſpicion. In truth, the facts were all againſt it: For what could induce Waſhington to keep different poſts ſurrounding the Britiſh lines, and conſtant patroles, frequently coming within ſight of them, but to prevent a ſupply of proviſions? Theſe patroles put to death, without heſitation, ſeveral perſons, for no other offence than that of ſupplying the Britiſh troops. Some were tried by a court-martial, and received two hundred laſhes; and others were branded by a hot iron in the hand, with G. H. and ſent into the Britiſh lines, as a mark of contempt of the Britiſh General. And yet all this is not ſufficient to remove his "ſuſpicions" of the diſloyalty of theſe faithful people, nor to induce him to believe that his enemy, who was beſieging him, intended

tended to deprive him of the means of ſubſiſting his troops!

Ibid.] "*The General is at a loſs to underſtand what I mean by many thouſands of Loyaliſts concealing themſelves in diſtant provinces, and taking refuge among the ſavages, to avoid entering into the war.*"

I did not mean, as he ſuſpects, "the inſurgents of Carolina;" and if I had, I ſhould have thought that a General who had commanded his Majeſty's army, might have found a word more deſcriptive of a number of Loyaliſts who had taken up arms under the authority of his Majeſty's Governor, to ſupport his government, than the word *inſurgent*. However, the men alluded to were thoſe who, when draughted from the militia of the rebel States, rather than ſerve in their army, fled the provinces from whence they were draughted, into others where they were not known. Many took refuge among the Indians, and have ſince joined Colonel Butler and Captain Brant, and are now ſerving againſt the rebels. This was a common practice; and it was partly owing to this practice that Waſhington's continental army has been ſo ſmall ever ſince their defeat on Long Iſland, as not to amount, at any one time, to more than 10,000 men.

To my aſſertion, "That many thouſands came over to the Britiſh troops for protection," the General anſwers,

Ibid.] "*I aver, that at no time did men in numbers come over to the Britiſh troops.*"

Here he does not venture to deny the fact, yet he manifeſtly intends to miſlead the reader. And to do this, he is obliged to add the words, "at no time," and "in numbers." Thus he artfully attempts to avoid a fact which cannot be denied. I did not aſſert, that thouſands came over "at one time," or "in numbers." The General ſuffered Waſhington to ſuperintend his lines at New York with ſo much circumſpection, as not to ſuffer the Loyaliſts to come in, in numbers; and when he went to Pennſylvania, the people were ordered, by

his

his declaration, to "remain peaceably at their uſual places of abode."

But had the fact been denied, it could be ſupported by the number of refugees, perſecuted on account of their loyalty, who came from time to time into Philadelphia and New York, many of whom are at this time embodied in corps in his Majeſty's ſervice. And it appears from the teſtimony of Lord Cornwallis (p. 68.) that while the Britiſh army was at Trenton and Bordentown, "three or four hundred of the inhabitants" came in *every day for ten days* (that is, while the troops ſtaid there,) and received certificates for their protection; and he might have ſaid with truth, that before the taking of Trenton, not leſs than 7000 had, in the ſpace of three weeks only, received thoſe certificates. But theſe certificates were of little uſe to the unhappy people;—all who were in or near the Britiſh lines were plundered; and the faith of the General, pledged to the people by his proclamation, was ſhamefully violated.

Upon my aſſertion, That "the foot and cavalry ſent over to America, amounted to 52,815; and of that number 40,874 were under the command of Sir William Howe," the General obſerves,

Page. 45.] "*Mr. Galloway applied to me for permiſſion to raiſe a troop of dragoons, which, he aſſured me, ſhould be compoſed of native Americans. It turned out, that very few of the men raiſed were* AMERICANS."

The General's memory has here failed in ſeveral particulars. The warrant ſigned by himſelf will prove it. Mr. Galloway applied for permiſſion to raiſe a regiment. He only obtained one for raiſing a troop. That warrant is in the ſtyle and words of all the other warrants for raiſing American troops, under which natives of every country, living in America, were received, without objection. The words, "*native*" *Americans*, or any others of that import, are not in it. The warrant being his direction, he concluded, that if he raiſed faithful ſubjects of the Crown, it would not be material what country

country gave them birth. And, therefore, the firſt ſtep he took was, to recommend to the General, for a Captain's commiſſion, a gentleman long reſident in Bucks county, but born *in Ireland*. This recommendation met with the General's approbation, without the leaſt objection to the country. Nor did Mr. Galloway, or the Captain, ever receive the leaſt intimation that the troopers ſhould be only natives of America, until the corps was more than full, and the men appeared to be muſtered. After this, the Captain reported to Mr. Galloway, that the officer who muſtered them made this objection to ſome of the men. Mr. Galloway referred Captain Hoveden to his warrant. Upon which Mr. Galloway complained to the officer of this, and other difficulties, which had been thrown in the way to the raiſing of this troop; and he heard nothing more of the objection, until he ſaw it in the General's Anſwer. Nor is it true, that "very few of the men were Americans." There were more natives of America in that troop, than in any other corps, of the ſame number, hitherto raiſed in that country; and but "few" who were not ſo.

In reſpect to this troop, there was ſomething ſingular and extraordinary in the General's conduct. Mr. Galloway having raiſed it, expected it would have been mixed with the other cavalry. But he found, that the General wiſhed to truſt him with the direction of its operations. This gave him ſome ſurpriſe, as he was no military man. But being "a Lawyer," as Sir William Howe in deriſion ſtyles him, he perhaps had ſome vanity, and that vanity prompted him to render ſome ſervice to his Country by his uninſtructed endeavours. A number of reputable farmers, and the ſons of farmers, from the county of Bucks, the place of his ſummer's retirement, had come in to him. Theſe he embodied as volunteers, who ſerved the Crown until the evacuation of Philadelphia, without pay or clothing. Of this troop Mr. Galloway, with the General's permiſſion, undertook to direct the operations.

The

The numerous and important ſervices they performed in a few months, may be ſeen by the following Relation.

With theſe two corps Mr. Galloway conſtantly harraſſed and diſtreſſed the Rebels, and relieved the friends of Government from the oppreſſion of the Committee-Men, Rebel Magiſtrates, and Collectors. Of theſe they brought in numbers, ſcouring the whole country between Philadelphia and Trenton of all the diſaffected. Waſhington, to relieve his half-naked men, who were periſhing with cold in their uncomfortable huts, had ſeized on and collected at Newtown all the cloth in the county of Bucks; and there, under a guard of 38 men, was making it up for his army. Mr. Galloway ſent out 24 of his troop, and 14 of his volunteers, to take it. This they performed in leſs than 24 hours; and after having ſtormed, with ſuch ſkill and addreſs as not to loſe a man, two rebel poſts, killed eight men, taken a Major, ſeveral other officers and privates, they returned with thirty-two priſoners and all the cloth. In this excurſion the volunteers marched on foot ſixty miles.

Mr. Galloway next meditated an expedition againſt Briſtol, with 40 horſe and 50 of the volunteers; but receiving intelligence that upwards of 200 of the rebel troops had appeared within five miles of the Britiſh lines, and fearing that they might take ſuch a poſt as to enable them to cut off the retreat of his party on their return; he ordered Captain Hoveden to take the route by Smithfield, where he ſuſpected they would be found; and if there, to attack them while his men were freſh, and not incumbered with priſoners, &c. but if not, to proceed to Briſtol. The Rebels were at Smithfield, as he ſuſpected. They were attacked by leſs than half of their numbers.—They were defeated and diſperſed, twenty-three killed, and eight taken priſoners.

In a few days after, the ſame numbers of the troop and refugees were intended to be ſent againſt Briſtol,

Briſtol. But they had hitherto ſucceeded ſo well, that the General did not chuſe to truſt them alone any longer, and therefore ſome Britiſh horſe joined them. Briſtol was taken; but the American troop and volunteers were not ſuffered to ſearch for the Rebels, many of whom lay hid in different houſes, and by that means eſcaped. In the midſt of the buſineſs the troops were called off; and the buſineſs they were ſent to perform was not half performed, although there was no enemy within 40 miles of the town they had taken.

Mr. Galloway having intelligence of eighty head of fat cattle, which were on the road to Waſhington's camp, was about to ſend out his troop to take them. The General again added a very few of the Britiſh horſe, to take from Mr. Galloway the credit of the enterpriſe. The cattle were taken within a few miles of the Rebel camp.

Mr. Galloway next concerted a plan for taking Governor Livingſton, and his whole Council and Aſſembly then ſitting at Trenton, with a number of others, the moſt violent Rebels in Jerſey. His intelligence was ſo perfect, that his ſcheme could not have failed. The whole Rebel force conſiſted only of 40 light horſe and 20 militia.—Theſe, unſuſpicious of attack, were every night off their guard. The friends to Government in Trenton were prepared to aſſiſt. And Mr. Galloway propoſed to execute this plan with his whole troop and his 80 volunteers.—The General at firſt approved of the plan.—The day was fixed. But here again he would unite with the party ſome light infantry. To this Mr. Galloway had no right to object, though totally unneceſſary. Major Bruin was appointed to command the expedition. He called on Mr. Galloway, to conſult him upon the beſt mode of carrying it into execution. Mr. Galloway's ſpies were now returned a ſecond time with the moſt favourable intelligence, and he had given orders to his troop and volunteers to hold themſelves in readineſs at the hour appointed. *But he had already*

already brought in more than 200 priſoners, and had done much miſchief to the Rebels, and now offered to do much more than was thought prudent or proper. The General's Aid de-Camp came down to him, to inform him that the expedition muſt not be proſecuted. Mr. Galloway knowing it to be practicable without any riſque, was ſurpriſed at the meſſage, and, perhaps improperly, urged to know the reaſon. The anſwer was, that it was of no importance; for that as the General expected a cartel for a general exchange of priſoners would ſoon take place, the acquiſition of the *Governor, Council, and Aſſembly of New Jerſey* would be of little uſe, as they would be ſoon exchanged; and yet they are truths which the reader will ſcarcely believe, that Governor Franklin, and many other faithful ſubjects of the Crown, had been at that time long impriſoned by the Rebels; and that the capture of the officers of the legiſlative and executive departments of a whole province would ſo embarraſs its future exertions, that a military corps of 1000 men might have reſtored New Jerſey to the peace of the Crown, and opened a communication with New York.

However, from this time the troop was taken from under Mr. Galloway's direction, and ordered into New Jerſey, to operate in a thick wood. Sir William Erſkine, whoſe gallantry and ſervices, and whoſe honeſt wiſhes to ſerve his country cannot be too much applauded, having formed an attachment to the troop, came to Mr. Galloway and informed him of the order—and declared, that they would ſoon be cut to pieces in their operations in ſo woody a country—and further offered to go to the General with Mr. Galloway, to prevail on him to ſuperſede the order. They both went—Sir William was only admitted, who ſoon returned, and informed Mr. Galloway that he could not ſucceed. Shortly after this, eight of the troop were ſurrounded in a wood by forty of Polaſki's light dragoons. But theſe gallant men reſolved not to yield, nor to be taken alive; and, excepting two who

were cut to pieces, and two who were wounded, fought their way through their enemy. Theſe circumſtances and ſervices are here recited, to ſhew what kind of a troop it was on which the General has thought proper to beſtow his cenſure.

To theſe ſervices it may be added, as a farther proof in favour of this troop, if further proof can be wanting, that Sir Henry Clinton was ſo fully convinced of its fidelity and gallantry, that they often attended him as his Body-guard.

Page 45.] "*The Author would here impreſs the Reader with an opinion, that,* AT THE TIME OF MY ARRIVAL AT STATEN ISLAND, *my army amounted to* 48,874, *and the rebel army to* 18,000, *militia included.*"

The concluſion here drawn from my words, I believe never was made by any candid and ſenſible reader. The words are indefinite as to the time or times when the troops were ſent, and convey nothing more, than that all the troops ſent over amounted to 52,815, of which troops General Howe had 40,874 under his command. But what could he do? He could not deny the fact; and it was too important an evidence of his miſconduct to be paſſed over in ſilence; and therefore he reſolves to torture my general expreſſions to a particular meaning, in order to divert the reader from reflecting on the ſuperiority of his force to that of the rebels. Indeed, I have often occaſion to admire the like ingenuity in the courſe of his obſervations: for where he cannot ſafely attack in front, he ſeldom fails to make uſe of ſtratagem to get round his opponent. What pity it is! What millions would have been ſaved to the nation, what heavy diſaſters to his country, had he diſcovered equal ſkill, in ſurrounding and attacking his inferior and undiſciplined enemy in America!

The art here made uſe of will appear yet more barefaced, when the reader is reminded, that in the Appendix to my Letters, I ſtate his numbers in Auguſt 1776, when he was at Staten Iſland, at not more than 24,000 men. But he contends, that I have

have exaggerated his numbers; for that when he landed from Staten Iſland on Long Iſland, he had only "20,121 *rank and file*, of which 1677 were ſick." To diminiſh his real force, he here gives us only the rank and file, omitting the numerous officers, from himſelf down to a drummer, which generally amount, in every corps, to near one ſixth part of the whole. I am not a military man; my deſign was to lay before my country his real force, that they might form a juſt judgment of his conduct. I have not therefore wrote in a military dialect; and if I had, few of my readers would have underſtood me; and could I believe that I had miſrepreſented his real force in any one inſtance, it would give me pain. But this I have not done. His own returns laid before the Houſe of Commons, in the laſt year, will prove, that he had at Staten Iſland 24,464 effectives, rank and file, and fit for duty; and, in the whole, 26,980, officers not included, who, when added, will amount to 31,625.

Ibid.] He finds much fault with my eſtimate of his real numbers; and adds, "*If I were to follow the Author's mode of computation, when he ſtates the number of men under my command, I ſhould ſay, and from better authority, that General Waſhington had under his command in May* 1776, *in the ſeveral provinces, an army of* 80,000 *men;*" and he refers to a return of the rebel ſtrength in May 1776, printed at New York.

The General does not lay any ſtreſs on this ſham return. He knew its fallacy: It was a return of men intended to be raiſed, and which were never raiſed, calculated to give him a formidable idea of the rebel force; and being ridiculous in itſelf, it is produced to render my eſtimate of his own force ridiculous and falſe. But to expoſe his evaſion I will give the reader his real numbers from his own returns. The firſt column ſhall contain the total effectives rank and file; the ſecond, the total army, officers included; the third, that of

the American army; that every unprejudiced and impartial reader may compare the Britiſh force with that of the rebels. For, after all our inquiries into the minute tranſactions of any military command, the firſt queſtion of a man of ſenſe will be, What was the reſpective force and diſcipline of the two contending armies?

1776.	Total Effectives, Rank and File.	Total Army, Officers included.	Total Rebel Force.
Aug. 9.	24,247	29,308	18,000
Nov. 22.	26,980	31,755	4,000
Dec.	—	—	3,300
1777.			
July 17.	30,049	35,047	8,000

Such was the ſtate of the force under Sir William Howe's immediate command, excluſive of the garriſon at Rhode Iſland, which added, amounts, in the whole, to 40,874; and ſuch the numbers of his inferior, and truly contemptible, enemy, notwithſtanding, as the General confeſſes, "every compulſory means" was made uſe of to increaſe them; and yet he ſuffered that enemy, lying in an unfortified poſt, within twenty miles of his quarters, to haraſs and diſtreſs his troops from January to July, without taking a ſingle ſtep to diſlodge them.

The ſame unjuſtifiable miſconduct attended his proceedings while in Philadelphia. Here the General lay in his quarters all the winter and ſpring, until the month of June; contenting himſelf with ſending out occaſional parties to cover the loyaliſts, who were continually feeding the officers of his army with all the delicacies and luxuries which the country afforded. To ſupport this charge, nothing more will be neceſſary, than to lay before the public a few facts notorious in America, and to many gentlemen now in England.

Although the General, in page 60, aſſerts, that his whole force at Philadelphia was no more than 13,799, rank and file, it does appear, by his own returns,

returns, that he had, on the 3d of October, after the battle of Brandywine, 15,898 effectives, rank and file; total, rank and file, 17,752; and, when the officers are added, 20,680. With this force, a few men loſt in the battle of Germantown excepted, he went into winter-quarters in Philadelphia, where he ſays it was "well accommodated."

Waſhington, with about 9000 men, took up his quarters at the Valley Forge, within twenty miles of Philadelphia. Having no houſes for his troops, he was obliged to build uncomfortable huts with round logs, filled in with clay, and covered with looſe ſtraw and dirt, in ſuch a manner as not to ſecure them from the weather. This ſituation the General, in his letter of the 5th of March, deſcribes in theſe words; "The rebel army continues in the ſame ſituation as when I had laſt the honour of writing to your Lordſhip, *hutted* at Valley Forge, where their men *ſuffer exceedingly* from the very *inclement* weather, which has induced numbers to deſert." The camp-diſorder raged among his men, which obliged him to eſtabliſh no leſs than eleven hoſpitals; and many died, many deſerted to their ſeveral provinces, and near 3000 of them came over to the Britiſh army. From theſe circumſtances, his army was reduced, before the month of March, to leſs than 4000 men; and by far the greater part of theſe were in a manner naked; many without ſhoes or ſtockings, and but few, except the Virginians, with the neceſſary clothing. His horſes were in a condition yet worſe; they were conſtantly expoſed to ſhowers of rain, and falls of ſnow, both day and night; many of them died; the reſt were ſo emaciated as to be unfit for labour; and, in addition to this diſtreſsful ſituation, Waſhington had not in his camp, at any one time, one week's proviſions either for man or horſe, and ſometimes his men were totally deſtitute.

Waſhington's camp was by no means difficult of acceſs; far leſs ſo than the poſts occupied by him at the Brandywine; and in one part of the front

the aſcent was ſcarcely perceptible, and his rear was commanded by higher ground. His ditches were not three feet in depth; nor was there a drummer in the Britiſh army, who could not, with the utmoſt eaſe, leap over them; and his defences might have been battered down with ſix-pounders.

This is not an exaggerated picture of the rebel army, nor of the weakneſs of its ſituation. A brief account of it I have given in my Letters, which the General, in his Defence, has not denied; indeed, he has thought it prudent to take no notice of it, any more than of many of the moſt important charges contained in thoſe Letters. Upon theſe facts I leave the candour of the public to find a reaſon why the General did not attack, or ſurround, and take by ſiege, Waſhington's whole army. His numbers were greater than thoſe of the rebels, who ſurrounded and took a Britiſh army, under General Burgoyne, of 4000 veteran troops, in a ſituation not ſo diſtreſsful as that of Waſhington.

Numerous are the inſtances in which the General has perverted my meaning. I have charged him with "declining to truſt the faithful and loyal ſubjects with arms, or to make uſe of the *well-affected force in the Colonies, to aſſiſt him in reducing, or in defending after reduced, either cities or provinces.*" In this charge I alluded to his declining to embody the Loyaliſts, as a militia, in New York, New Jerſey, and Philadelphia. In New York, the militia, which he declined to embody, amounts to 5000 men. In New Jerſey, upwards of fifty of the firſt men in the county of Monmouth, &c. came in to offer their ſervice in diſarming the diſaffected, and to reſtore the province to the peace of the Crown; but they could not procure acceſs to the General, although their wiſhes were communicated to his Aid de Camp. They returned to their reſpective families, chagrined and diſguſted at the *hauteur* of the General; ſome of them, notwithſtanding, are now at New York, under the protection of the Britiſh army, having abandoned their property,

hazarded

hazarded their lives, and ſacrificed the happineſs of their families. At Philadelphia, at leaſt 3,500 faithful militia might have been embodied in arms for the defence of that city, while the army operated againſt Waſhington: and had the General at the ſame time cordially invited the Loyaliſts to take up arms, as a militia, in their ſeveral counties, under gentlemen in whom they had a confidence, for ſeizing on and diſarming the diſaffected to Government, and defending their ſeveral diſtricts, the whole province of Pennſylvania, and the extenſive peninſula below, would have been reſtored to the Crown before the end of the campaign.

To parry this charge, the General aſſerts, page 56, "*Many of my proclamations contained invitations to arms, and promiſes of large encouragement.*" Where theſe proclamations are to be found, he has not told us; they never were publiſhed in Pennſylvania, New York, or New Jerſey; and I verily believe they never were written. The proclamation iſſued in 1776, in New Jerſey, contained nothing more than a promiſe of pardon and protection to thoſe who ſhould come in and take the oaths of allegiance; that at the head of Elk reſted only in promiſing the people protection from the "depredations of his army," and calling on the diſaffected "to remain peaceably at their uſual places of abode."

Before I leave the laſt-mentioned proclamation, I cannot avoid taking notice of a paragraph in

Page 56.] "As this declaration was calculated for the meridian of Pennſylvania, of the people of which province Mr. Galloway profeſſed an intimate knowledge, *I conſulted him previouſly* upon it; I framed it *agreeably to his ideas;* when written, it had his *full approbation.*"

Here, I hope, the General's memory has failed him. The facts relating to this tranſaction are theſe. While the fleet lay at the Hook, on its way to the Cheſapeak, and not before, Captain Montreſor brought this declaration *in manuſcript*, from the General, to Mr. Galloway, with a requeſt

that

that he would conſider it. Upon the firſt view, a number of objections aroſe; he immediately committed them to paper, ſupported with his reaſons. Theſe he returned, with the declaration, to Captain Montreſor, to be carried back to the General. Upon Captain Montreſor's return, Mr. Galloway aſked, what the General ſaid to his objections? The anſwer was, that they were not admitted; *for the declarations had been already printed off at New York.*

This is the whole truth. Captain Montreſor, and two other gentlemen, were privy to this tranſaction, whoſe honour, I have no doubt, will lead them to confirm it. On this paragraph I ſhall leave the reader to make his own comment, only obſerving, that the General, in every inſtance where he has taken occaſion to mention Mr. Galloway's conduct, has been guilty of what charity would lead me to hope are only failures of memory.

The General labours hard, in his Narrative, to vindicate his conduct in not ſupporting the Northern army. Nor ought we to be ſurpriſed at it, as it was a neglect which ſtrikes the mind on the firſt reflection; a blunder to which we owe all our preſent misfortunes. His arguments may be compriſed under three heads. 1ſt, That he had no expreſs orders to ſupport it; 2d, That he had not force ſufficient; and, 3d, That his *Southern expedition* was approved of by the Secretary of State.

In reply to the firſt argument, ſhould we agree to what he aſſerts, that the expreſs orders to ſupport the Northern army were never received, yet we know that a letter from Lord George Germain, of the 3d of March, 1777, came to his hands on the 8th of May. That in this letter he is informed, it was his Majeſty's opinion, that "a warm diverſion ſhould be made on the coaſts of the Maſſachuſets;" and that the "benefits" which "muſt inevitably reſult" from it, are pointed out, viz. "That it will not only tend much to "impede the levies" for the Continental army, but to the ſecurity of our trade, and would "keep the *rebels at home*," *for the internal*

defence

defence of their own reſpective diſtricts. A more wiſe or a more neceſſary diverſion, to ſave the Northern army, could not have been deviſed; and had it been performed at the time Gen. Burgoyne paſſed from Ticonderoga towards Albany, it muſt have produced the effects his Majeſty predicted. Levies never were, nor can be made, in the ſcene and buſtle of war; and men will not leave the defence of their fire-ſides, their principal ſea-ports, and moſt valuable cities, to fight in a different province, and in diſtant woods, where there is nothing to defend.

This diverſion, therefore, had it been made, muſt either have drawn General Gates, with his whole army, to the defence of the capital cities on the ſea-coaſt, or at leaſt have detained at home more than one half of thoſe men, which, by this neglect, were enabled to join his army: and in that caſe the Northern army could not have failed of overcoming every difficulty.

But I will ſuppoſe that no ſuch diverſion had been directed. The General could not but know, that the object of the two armies was the ſame, and that it was the immediate buſineſs of both to form a junction. Was it not then his duty to ſee ſo large and important a reinforcement in a ſtate of ſafety, at leaſt, before he carried his army to a place which deprived him of the power to ſupport it? However, it ſeems, notwithſtanding his Majeſty's directions, and the importance of the meaſure, the General and his Noble Brother "conſulted upon the expediency of the diverſion," yet neither made it, nor took any meaſures to ſupport the Northern expedition: in conſequence of which, a Britiſh army paſſed under the yoke of rebellion.

I have hitherto reaſoned upon a ſuppoſition, that the General had no expreſs orders to co-operate with the Northern army; and I truſt, the arguments I have advanced are ſufficient to prove, that, in not doing it, he acted contrary to his manifeſt duty. But, to ſtrip him even of the ſhadow of an excuſe, I will prove that he had thoſe orders, or what fully amounted to them.

On

On the 25th of September, 1775, he received his commiſſion of Commander in Chief. On the 9th of October he undertakes to propoſe the plan of his future operations; recommends the evacuation of Boſton, and that a body of 12,000 men be employed "from New York, *to open the communication with Canada in the firſt inſtance*," and that an army of Canadians and Indians from Canada ſhould meet him: and, that "the accompliſhment of the primary object for opening the communication, being obtained by the *two armies*, theſe corps might take ſeparate routes into the province of Maſſachuſet's Bay." And in his letter of the 2d of April, 1777, he points out "the advantages that might ariſe by ſecuring *Albany and the adjacent country*."

Strictly conformable to theſe ideas of the General, Government proceeded. His own army was reinforced with numbers ſo great, that it ſtruck him with utter amazement. Another army was formed, and ordered to proceed from Canada to join his troops at Albany. On the 25th of March, the Secretary of State tranſmitted to Sir Guy Carleton, at Quebec, the plan of operations for both armies; in which he is ordered "to detach General Burgoyne," and to direct him, "ſo detached, to proceed with all poſſible expedition *to Albany, and put himſelf under the command of Sir William Howe*;" and further adds, "with a view of quelling the rebellion as ſoon as poſſible, it is become neceſſary that the moſt *ſpeedy junction of the two armies ſhould be effected*." An official copy of this letter was tranſmitted to Sir William Howe, and was received by him on the 5th of June, ſix weeks before he ſailed on his wild expedition to the Cheſapeak. By theſe letters, the following truths are in full evidence: That the plan of the *Northern operations was the General's own*, and not the plan of Adminiſtration: That he received *written orders* to "effect a ſpeedy junction" of the two armies, and that that junction was to be made *at Albany*. This is ſo plain, that it would be an affront to the reader's underſtanding

to

to ſay more on the ſubject. In vain will the General plead, that he never received his orders. For what end was the official copy of the plan of operations ſent to him? Was it to anſwer no purpoſe? Or was it to ſignify his Majeſty's pleaſure reſpecting thoſe operations? How idle, then, muſt this part of his Defence appear, when the *junction of the two armies* was not only conformable to his own plan, but clearly pointed out by reaſon, military duty, and by his Majeſty's orders!

As to his ſecond objection, that he had not force ſufficient, I need only remind my reader, that the General had under his command, on the 17th of July 1777, as appears by his own returns, 40,874 men, officers included. His Southern army conſiſted of 20,680; the garriſon of Rhode Iſland required only 2400, as he confeſſes in his ſecret letter of the 2d April, 1777; his remaining force was 17,794. In the ſame letter, he ſtates as ſufficient for the defence of New York and New York Iſland 3200, of Paulus Hook 300, of Staten Iſland 1200; in the whole 4700. This number, deducted out of 17,794, will leave 13,094, beſides 3000 effectives, of the provincial corps under General Tryon. This will make the force under his command, excluſive of his Southern army, and his neceſſary garriſons, 16,094. I will alſo ſuppoſe, which is a very extravagant ſuppoſition, that every ſixth man was an invalid, and it will leave 13,412 effectives, whom he might have applied to the ſupport of the Northern army; but, not inclined to ſupport that army, he left uſeleſs thouſands in the garriſon of Rhode Iſland, and carried with him, in his wild circuitous voyage to the Cheſapeak, as many thouſands, equally unneceſſary; for there was not the moſt diſtant proſpect that the enemy could ever raiſe an army, equal, in effective force, to 10,000 veteran troops.

But further. He acknowledges, page 61, that he "left at New York about 8500 rank and file, fit for duty." I have ſhewn, that he thought 4700 were

were competent to the defence of all his garriſons; why then did he not order the remaining 3800 to make the diverſion on the coaſts of New England, as had been directed by his Majeſty? a force more than ſufficient, if properly conducted, to have detained the whole militia of that country in the defence of their capital towns and valuable ſea-ports, which muſt have enabled General Burgoyne to paſs without difficulty to New York.

The third argument remains to be examined. The General repeatedly declares that the Secretary of State approved of his "expedition to Pennſylvania." This aſſertion is of the ſame complexion with that of Mr. Galloway's approving of a proclamation, at a time he had never heard of it. The facts are: In his letter on the 20th of January, 1777, he propoſes "to detach a *corps* only to enter the Delaware *by ſea*, and the *main body* of the army to penetrate into Pennſylvania *by way of Jerſey*." This meaſure was founded in the ſoundeſt policy, and juſtified by common ſenſe; becauſe, had it been purſued, Waſhington, having at that time only 8000 men, muſt have fought, or fled before him out of New Jerſey, over the Delaware. Waſhington's ſafety depended on his taking this route; his military ſtores and proviſions were all on the other ſide of the Delaware: cut off from theſe eſſentials of war, he muſt have given up the conteſt. Waſhington once defeated, or driven over the Delaware, the province of New Jerſey might have been immediately reſtored to the Crown. Philadelphia, altogether without defence by land, and very little better by water, muſt have immediately fallen. A garriſon, more numerous than Waſhington's whole army, might have been left for its defence, and 10,000 men, at leaſt, ſpared to operate up the North River, or on the New England coaſts, in favour of the Northern army. All this might have been accompliſhed with eaſe by the latter end of Auguſt, although the campaign was not opened until the 12th of June; but had the General commenced

menced the operations on the 12th of May, the moſt proper month in the whole year for military operations in that part of America, it might have been completed by the latter end of July. This appearing evidently to be practicable, with the force under the General's command, every ſenſible man muſt applaud the council which induced his Majeſty to approve of the plan for invading Pennſylvania, "by the way of Jerſey."

This approbation was communicated by Lord George Germain, in his letter of the 3d of March; but before it could reach * the General, he had altered this judicious plan for one truly ridiculous, and ruinous not only to the Northern army, but his own operations: a plan which muſt neceſſarily have been attended with a great waſte of time, immenſe expence, unneceſſary riſque, and innumerable difficulties. In his letter of the 2d of April, he informs the Secretary of State, that, "from the *difficulties and delay* that would attend the paſſing the river Delaware, by a march through Jerſey, I propoſe to invade Pennſylvania *by ſea;* and from this arrangement we muſt *probably* abandon the Jerſeys, which, by *the former plan*, would not have been the caſe."

Will the General aſſert, that the Miniſter of the American department ever approved of this miſchievous change in his plan? Did he ever approve of his abandoning New Jerſey, his embarking on ſhip-board his whole army, and ſubjecting them to all the dangers of the ſea, without the leaſt neceſſity? The American Miniſter is too well verſed in military ſcience, to have approved of a plan pregnant with ſuch folly and infatuation; if he did, the General is called on to produce ſome proofs of that approbation.

This being the truth, the General will labour in vain to throw the blame of his own military abſurdities upon the ſhoulders of others. The plan was

* He did not receive it till the 8th of May.

truly *his own;* and it bears ſo *ſtrong* a reſemblance of his other military operations, that no one acquainted with them can doubt it. For by this wretched project the three ſtrong poſts of Brunſwick, Bonumtown, and Amboy, which had been fortified at an immenſe expence, were *given up;* the province of New Jerſey, which had been ſo lately reduced, *abandoned* to an enemy conſiſting of leſs than one third of his own numbers; and a Britiſh army, both cavalry and foot, was to be *embarked* in the hot holds of ſhips, in the hotteſt months of the year, to paſs into a yet more ſouthern and ſickly climate, and that too at a ſeaſon when contrary winds never yet failed to prevail. All theſe difficulties, together with the dangers of the ocean, were to be encountered in preference to a march of *fifty-eight miles* through a fine open country, interſected by a variety of roads, and ſtored with every neceſſary for the accommodation of an army!

But it ſeems, "the difficulties and delays, that would attend the paſſage of the Delaware, and the want of ſufficient means to paſs ſo *large* a river,"* were the obſtructions to his firſt plan. What will the reader ſay, when he is informed, that this *ſo large*, and *ſo much dreaded* river, is ever, in the months of June, July, and Auguſt, fordable in a variety of places, between Trenton and Coryel's Ferry, on the different roads to Philadelphia? and yet, if it was not ſo, that it is not, in many places, 300 yards wide; that the ground on the Jerſey ſide commands, in many parts, that on the Pennſylvania ſide, ſo that our army might have been perfectly covered by cannon in its paſſage; and that the General had prepared more boats and pontoons, which he carried with him to Brunſwick, than were neceſſary for that purpoſe? Thus circumſtanced, and thus prepared, what would an Amherſt, a Wolfe, or a Bouquet, have thought of difficulties ſo truly inſignificant!

* Narrative, p. 16.

As I have now before me Sir William Howe's general plans of operation, I cannot avoid taking notice of his change of opinion. As ſoon as he was appointed, his plan "was to open a communication with Canada, in the firſt inſtance." Soon after, with much good ſenſe, he reſolves to proſecute the advantages he had gained in New Jerſey, and to go to Philadelphia *by land*. This reſolution ſuddenly changes for a worſe, to go *by ſea*. We next ſee him alter this reſolution for one infinitely worſe ſtill, and to be equalled by none, ſave that of going to Philadelphia by way of the Weſt Indies: for he reſolves to go to Philadelphia, by "taking the courſe of the Cheſapeak." And even in this fourth reſolution he does not continue long, but changes it for his third, and again determines to go up "the Delaware;" and that for a very good reaſon, "in order to be nearer New York." And yet, after all this confuſion in opinion, we have ſeen his moſt judicious plan, approved of by his Majeſty, ſet aſide; and another, founded ſolely on his own wild ideas, unknown to any but his Noble Brother and himſelf, and which involved the operations of the campaign in confuſion and ruin, ultimately proſecuted. He led his army, contrary to his own declared opinion, that he ought to be "near New York," round Cape Charles, and waſted the beſt ſeaſon for military operations, from June to September, encountering difficulties and dangers, which the plan approved of by his Majeſty muſt infallibly have avoided. Such was the ſtrange and fatal verſatility of the General's councils and conduct!

It would be endleſs to take notice of all the miſtated facts, and the many diſingenuous arguments, adduced by the General. I ſhall, therefore, in future, content myſelf with giving brief anſwers to many of them, dwelling only on the groſſer blunders in his conduct.

He takes much pains to vindicate himſelf againſt the charge of not opening the campaign before the

month of June. He begins with contradicting my aſſertion, that the rebel levies never could join the army before that month; and avers, that their levies "joined early in the ſpring." Now this was not the fact; and it will be eaſy to convince the reader of its impoſſibility. The rebel army conſiſted of more than three-fourths Iriſh and Scotch, and leſs than one-fourth native Americans. The firſt generally came from the back parts of Pennſylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North and South Carolina; the ſecond, principally from the diſaffected New England colonies; ſo that at leaſt three-fourths of the new levies had from two, to five and ſeven hundred miles to march. The inclemency of the ſeaſon prevented them from ſetting out from the ſouthward until the beginning of April, and later from the northward: and therefore they could not join the army "early in the ſpring." The time of their junction, a ſmall part from the Middle Colonies excepted, was about the beginning of June; before which time, however reduced the number of the enemy might be, the General would never begin his principal operations.

But he ſays, "*We had not forage in quarters; nor could we have carried any quantities for eſſential ſervice.*"

If he had not forage in quarters, on what did his horſes ſubſiſt? they were always in high order. In his campaign of 1777, he might have commanded all that Long Iſland, Rhode Iſland, and Staten Iſland produced; and in that of 1778, had he choſe to open it before he reſigned his command, all that the environs of Philadelphia afforded, which was immenſe. And could he not have carried a fortnight or three weeks forage, or ſufficient to enable him to have attacked his enemy, lying not more than a day's march from his quarters? He had horſes and carriages ſufficient, and might have had more. Sir Jeffery Amherſt carried the proviſions for his army from Lancaſter to Montreal; General Forbes, from Lancaſter to Fort Pitt; and Colonel, Bouquet,

Bouquet, from Lancaſter, upwards of three hundred miles, to Muſkingum. But the true anſwer to all theſe weak apologies is, that the country was, at all ſeaſons of the year, plentifully ſtored with dry forage; and that a ſuperior army may procure it, if the Commander chooſes, from the ſame parts where it is daily obtained by the inferior: and more eſpecially where the country is generally diſaffected to that inferior army: beſides, it is well known to the people of that country, that the green forage, with which it abounds, is ſufficiently grown to ſupport cavalry, by the latter end of April. In a country thus poſſeſſed of dry and green forage, the General's horſes could have run no riſque. But there was a magnanimity which diſcovered itſelf in all his conduct, and which, if the real lovers of their country will not commend, his friends, in the oppoſition to Government, will ſupport and applaud! He ſcorned to imitate the *raſh impetuoſity of men*, who, too deeply impreſſed with the principles of honour, regard no difficulties; he therefore would never purſue the enemy whom he had defeated, nor attack him when unprepared; nor would he open the campaign until the levies of his enemy were joined.

So much for the campaign in 1777. He next attempts to juſtify his indolence in 1778. Here he apprehends that "he need not ſay much in his vindication, becauſe, VERY *early in April*, he received his *orders to return home.*"

The terms "*very early*" in April, are founded in miſtake. He did not receive a permiſſion from his Majeſty to return, until the 14th of that month; nor did he reſign his command until the 24th of May, near ſix weeks after. He continued, during that time, ſhamefully inactive in his winter-quarters, notwithſtanding, in the ſame letter which conveyed the leave to reſign, he was ordered by his Majeſty, "whilſt he continued in command, to lay hold of every opportunity of putting an end to the rebellion, by a due exertion of the force under his orders." The only movement of any conſequence, during

that ſix weeks, is not mentioned in his letters; however, as this exploit ought not to be concealed from the public, I will relate it.

On the 19th of May, the Marquis de la Fayette, with the main force of Waſhington's army, from Valley Forge, croſſed a bridge over the Schuylkill, and took poſt at Norrington. Intelligence of this movement was immediately communicated to the General. Pretending to ſhew a deſire to do ſomething before his departure, he marched out with a large part of his army, in two columns, as if he intended to attack the enemy. The firſt column, unperceived and unſuſpected, moved in a circuit round the enemy's poſt, and got perfectly in his rear, within ſight of his corps, and conſiderably nearer the bridge, over which only the Marquis could poſſibly return, while the other column advanced towards the enemy's front. Thus completely entrapped, the Marquis gave up all as loſt; he expected his retreat would have been inſtantly cut off. Waſhington, deſpairing of the ſafety of the flower of his army, immediately prepared to fly, with his remaining non-effectives, baggage, and artillery, to be drawn by a few ſtarved and emaciated horſes, towards the Suſquehannah; and nothing was wanting but a ſmall ſhare of military exertion, or, perhaps, inclination, to take or deſtroy the chief force of the rebel army. But here again, as at Brunſwick, Trenton, Hillſborough, Brandywine, and German Town, the enemy was ſuffered to make a yet more fortunate eſcape. The firſt column, inſtead of puſhing towards the bridge, in a good road leading to it on the right, and cutting off the enemy's retreat, while the other ſhould advance, and attack in front, was marched to the left, in a route more diſtant from the bridge, and thus, inſtead of intercepting the enemy, fell into his rear. The other column, under the immediate command of the General himſelf, *leiſurely* advanced in front. The paſſage to the bridge was left open; and the Marquis, having recovered from his deſpondency, made good his retreat, without loſs, and unmoleſted.

The

The words "*orders to return*," are diſingenuous, and evaſive. They convey the idea, that the General was removed from his command contrary to his wiſh; when the truth is, that as ſoon as he had done *as little good, and as much miſchief as poſſible*; as ſoon as he had depreſſed the ſpirits of the Loyaliſts, by his inacceſſibility, his injudicious appointments, his neglect of them when riſing in arms in his favour, and the indiſcriminate plunder made by his army; as ſoon as he had revived, by his diſgraceful attempts and retreats, that ſpirit of rebellion which he had ſo lately depreſſed; as ſoon as he had, by his manifeſt breach of military duty and the explicit orders of his Sovereign, ſacrificed a Britiſh army; as ſoon as he had overcome the heſitation and reluctance of the Houſe of Bourbon, and prevailed on it, by the indolence of his operations, openly and avowedly to ſupport the rebellion; I ſay, as ſoon as he had, with art and addreſs, brought this load of ignominy on the Britiſh arms, and theſe accumulated evils on his country, and not before, he petulantly inſiſted on his reſignation.

The reaſon aſſigned for his reſignation is ſo indecent and groundleſs, that I will give it to the reader in his own words. "From the LITTLE ATTENTION, given to my recommendations, ſince the commencement of my command, I am led to hope that I may be relieved from this very *painful ſervice*, wherein I have not the good fortune to enjoy the neceſſary confidence and ſupport of my ſuperiors, *but which, I conclude, will be extended to Sir Henry Clinton, my preſumptive ſucceſſor. By the return of the packet*, I humbly requeſt I may have his Majeſty's permiſſion to reſign*." In what this want of attention to his recommendations conſiſted, is not mentioned. If we look into the correſpondence between the Se-

* See his Letter of the 28th of October, 1778, to Lord George Germain.

cretary

cretary of State and the General, we ſhall not find it there; for in that it will appear, that if the General recommended a favourite to his Majeſty, he was ſure to receive promotion; and, to incite and oblige him, if honour conferred, and a ſenſe of gratitude could oblige him, to do his duty, the order of Knighthood was beſtowed by his Sovereign on himſelf. And when we conſider his wanton and extravagant demands for more force, with the exertions made by Government to gratify him, we ſhall find, that his complaint of a want "of the "confidence and ſupport of his ſuperiors," was made without the leaſt foundation.

When the meaſures for reducing the revolted Colonies were reſolved on, and the General was appointed to the command, ſuch was the diſpoſition of Government to gratify him in whatever he ſhould deſire, that the Secretary of State declared, "the meaſures of force ſhould be the wiſhes of the General." The General, who was then in America, and had the ſtate of the rebellion before him, was the beſt judge of the force which would be competent to its ſuppreſſion; on his judgment, therefore, Government relied, and, inſtead of ſtinting, ſurpaſſed his wiſhes. In his letter to the Secretary of State, after long and mature deliberation, he only requires 19,000 men, which, he ſays, will be "adequate to an active offenſive campaign on the ſide of New York and Rhode Iſland. To combat this force, he apprehended the rebels would not have leſs than 10,000 men on the ſide of Rhode Iſland, and 20,000 men to act againſt General Carleton on one hand, and the New York corps on the other." Inſtead of 19,000 men, he was furniſhed with 31,476; and although he expected to meet a force of 30,000 men, the whole rebel army did not amount to 18,000. With the force now ſent, and which amounted to 11,000 men more than he required, the General appears to be more than ſatisfied, and declares his "utter aſtoniſhment at the uncommon exertions" of Government;

ment; and yet, in his letter of the 23th of September, 1776, after he had defeated his enemy, and taken, killed, and diſperſed more than half of his force, he begins his extravagant requiſitions; and, with a manifeſt deſign to diſtreſs Government, he requires "ten line of battle ſhips, with a number of ſupernumerary ſeamen, for manning boats." Would any perſon ſuſpect, that, at this time, the Admiral had 65 ſhips of war; 13 carrying from 50 to 70 guns, 28 frigates, and 34 ſloops; and that the whole naval force of America was no more than three frigates and ſix ſloops of war? To what uſe did the General mean to apply the additional "ten ſhips of the line," which could not be performed by the force already under his Brother's command? Was it to batter down the fortifications of the rebel ports and harbours? We know they had none. Was it to penetrate up their ſhoal and narrow rivers, when he had ſo many frigates, and ſloops of war, only proper for that ſervice? Did he want them to defeat the truly contemptible naval force of the enemy, when the Admiral had upwards of 60 veſſels of war under his command?

It will be as impoſſible for us to conceive to what uſe the General intended to apply the "ſupernumerary ſeamen." His Noble Brother had not leſs than 12,000 mariners on board the ſhips of war and tranſports then under his command. Surely, out of ſo great a number, men ſufficient might be ſpared to man his boats, at any time, and upon any occaſion; and yet, notwithſtanding the unreaſonableneſs of theſe demands, more ſhips, and of a better and more uſeful ſize, than was aſked, were ſent over, viz. one ſhip of 44 guns, 10 of 32, one of 28, and one of 8 guns.

The General, page 41, acknowledges, that, when Mr. Galloway came over to the army, in December 1776 (which was on the firſt day of that month,) "his great ſucceſſes had intimidated the leaders of the rebellion, and nearly induced a general ſubmiſſion." And indeed this confeſſion, however unwarily

warily made, was ſtrictly true; for further oppoſition was univerſally deſpaired of by all America, except a few deſperate men in Waſhington's army, and that army was reduced to leſs than 3500 men. And yet at that very period, viz. on the 30th of November, he makes an additional demand of 15,000 rank and file; and in his letter of the 20th of January, this demand is increaſed to 20,000; and he declares, that this number "would by no means exceed his wants; yet 15,000 will give us a ſuperiority."

The reader will be as much at a loſs to diſcover to what uſe the General would have applied this additional 20,000 men, as he has been in reſpect to the ten ſhips of the line. Both of theſe demands, when his force is conſidered, will appear equally extravagant. He had then, as appears by his own returns, 31,476 men, officers included, and the whole Continental force did not amount to 3500; and yet, in compliance with this extravagant and wanton requiſition, ſo far as it was poſſible to be complied with, 7800 troops were, with all expedition, ſent over to him.

The General, it ſeems, did not make this extravagant demand without aſſigning a reaſon for it. Reaſons, or what he thought would carry the weight of reaſons, were always at hand, when the Miniſter could receive no ſtate of facts but by the packets under the General's command, and when all letters from America were liable to his inſpection. Perhaps Government never committed a greater miſtake, than that of ſuffering the line of intelligence, from countries where its ſervants are employed, to be taken out of the hands of the confidential officer. It enables its own ſervants to miſrepreſent the ſtate of the country, the diſpoſition of the people, the numbers of the enemy, and to put what gloſs they pleaſe on their own miſconduct, without a poſſibility of detection; and from theſe miſrepreſentations it has often happened, that men

have

have met with applauſe, when, in juſtice, they ſhould have received condemnation and diſgrace.

But the reaſons aſſigned were groundleſs and romantic. In his letter of the 12th of February, he informed the Secretary of State, that "the rebels have proſpects of bringing an army into the field of *more than* 50,000 men. They are moſt ſanguine in their expectations, and, conſcious that their whole ſtake depends upon the ſucceſs of the next campaign, uſe every compulſory means to thoſe who do not enter *voluntarily* into their ſervice;" and yet, notwithſtanding all this ſanguineſs of expectation, and theſe "compulſory means," we know, that, inſtead of "more than 50,000 men," they were not able to bring into the field, when the General met their force at Hillſborough, more than 8000; and even at the Brandywine not more than 16,000, militia included; after he had, contrary to all policy, given them two months to recruit their feeble army by every poſſible exertion.

It thus appears, that if the reinforcement ſent fell ſhort of the force required by the General, the expected reinforcement of the rebels, which was the reaſon aſſigned for that requiſition, failed in a much greater proportion; more than one-half of the force required was ſent, and not more than one-fifth of that of the rebels was raiſed. The account of the force ſtood thus in 1777: Britiſh, 40,874 veteran troops; rebel regular army at Hillſborough, 8000; at Brandywine, 11,000: and, in the ſpring 1778, at the Valley Forge, 4000 undiſciplined troops. With what juſtice, then, can the General complain of his want of force, and how ſhameleſs is his attempt to throw the blame of his own miſconduct on that Adminiſtration, which has, by ſuch "uncommon exertions," thus gratified him in his extravagant requiſitions!

Pages from 50 to 59 are employed in attempting to prove *that the people of America are almoſt univerſally diſloyal, and that he did every thing in his power to encourage them to take up arms, without ſucceſs.*

Here

Here he aſſerts, that the "only attempt" made by a body of men, to aſſiſt in ſuppreſſing the rebellion, was in North Carolina, in 1776. Did the General never hear of two different bodies, who took arms in favour of Government, at different times, in the peninſula between the Delaware and Cheſapeak? Did he never ſee, or hear of the proclamation iſſued by the Congreſs, to ſuppreſs them? If he did not, all America ſaw it, and the people of Britain may alſo ſee it. Did he never hear, that, in ſeveral counties above Albany, the Loyaliſts, being by far the greater number, prevented the diſaffected from joining Gates, when going againſt General Burgoyne? This was a fact known to thouſands within his own lines. Did he never hear of the numerous offers made to Mr. Galloway, while the General was at Philadelphia, by the gentlemen of many counties, to take up arms, to diſarm the diſaffected, and to reſtore their reſpective diſtricts to the peace of the crown? He certainly did.

"The people of Staten Iſland, he confeſſes, (page 50) teſtified their loyalty by all the means in their power;" and General Tryon, and ſome other gentlemen, "who had taken refuge on board ſhip, informed him of the loyal diſpoſition of the people of New York and New Jerſey, &c." But it ſeems General Tryon, who had been many years Governor of the province, and the other gentlemen, who had lived long in New York, were all miſtaken.

In order to account for the abſurdity of his extenſive cantonments, he acknowledges, it was to "cover the county of Monmouth, *in which there are many loyal inhabitants.*" But here again the General found himſelf miſinformed; Governor Tryon, and a number of other gentlemen of New York, had before, as I have mentioned, deceived him. And now General Skinner, whom he warmly recommends to his Majeſty's favour, who was the Attorney-general of the province, and from whom he muſt, or ought to have taken his information reſpecting the people of Monmouth,

was

was alſo miſtaken. Theſe gentlemen, it ſeems, knew little about the diſpoſitions of the people of the country in which the moſt of them were born, and in which they had lived from their infancy; for, ſays he, "*many*, very *many* of the people of Monmouth were taken in arms againſt us, with my protections in their pockets." Had the General ſaid *ſome* and *but few*, of the people of New Jerſey had acted in this manner, he would have been much nearer the fact. Among the 6000 people who came in and took the oaths, ſome were, it may be ſuppoſed, diſaffected; but even theſe, we ought to ſuppoſe, would have kept their oaths, had not the proclamation been ſhamefully violated on the part of the General. The plunder was ſo indiſcriminate, and ſo exceſſive, that men were robbed of their all; and it was theſe diſaffected men, made deſperate by the breach of public faith, who were taken in arms, with his protections in their pockets, and none others. Let Britons, for a moment, ſuppoſe, that the military, who were ſent into the city of London to protect their perſons and properties againſt the violence of the late mob, inſtead of affording them that protection, had robbed their houſes, and polluted their wives and daughters; would they have tamely ſubmitted to ſuch outrages? Would their hearts have felt no diſpoſition to oppoſe ſuch enormous wickedneſs? Their ſenſibility will anſwer theſe queſtions. Indeed it is impoſſible for language to deſcribe the miſchiefs which the want of diſcipline in the Britiſh army, in this reſpect, brought on the ſervice; and men who are acquainted with it, are ſurpriſed that it had not produced, what, it is probable was intended, an univerſal revolt of all the Coloniſts.

As another inſtance of the diſloyalty of the Americans, the General ſays, "Several corps were offered to be raiſed, and were accepted, in the winter 1776, to conſiſt of 6500 men; but in May 1778, the whole number amounted to only 3609, including the brigades of Delancy and Skinner; a

little more than half the promiſed complement." The gentlemen who offered to raiſe theſe corps, expected that the General would have opened the field for recruiting. When they looked at his force, they ſaw it was practicable; but they were deceived by the miſconduct of the General. Brigadier-general Skinner's brigade was to have been raiſed in New Jerſey. This province the General had ſhamefully given up. Brigadier-general Delancy's corps was to have been raiſed in the province of New York, which he expected would have been open to his recruiting parties. But the General contented himſelf with the poſſeſſion of Long Iſland, Staten Iſland, and the iſland of New York; and, moreover, ſuffered his enemy, who had not 6000 effective men, to haraſs and beſiege him in his quarters, during the whole recruiting ſeaſon. When theſe facts are candidly conſidered, together with the ſmall number of Americans within the Britiſh lines, the man of ſenſe who will reflect how few men in a ſociety are willing to ſubject their perſons to the dangers of war, and to military diſcipline, will be ſurpriſed at the numbers enliſted under ſuch diſadvantages, and within ſo ſmall a compaſs; and will confeſs, that it is a ſtrong proof of the loyalty of the people.

At Philadelphia, the General inſinuates that he had made the ſame experiment on the loyalty of the people. "Mr. William Allen, a gentleman who was *ſuppoſed* to have *great family-influence* in that province; Mr. Chalmers, much reſpected in the three lower counties on Delaware, and in Maryland; Mr. Clifton, the chief of the Roman Catholic perſuaſion, of whom there were ſaid to be many in Philadelphia, as well as in the rebel army, ſerving againſt their inclinations, were appointed commandants of corps." And what was the ſucceſs of theſe efforts? He tells us, "they only amounted to 800 men, including three troops of light dragoons, conſiſting of 132 troopers."

All

All this is plauſible, but fallacious. It was the duty of the General to enquire after popular characters for theſe appointments; but he ſought the moſt unpopular. Mr. Allen was a young gentleman, whoſe family-influence was conſiderable among the Republican party, before they ſubverted the proprietary government, and threatened to ſeize on the proprietary eſtate; but, after theſe circumſtances took place, that influence was loſt: he had been alſo a colonel in the rebel ſervice, in the Canada expedition. I do not mention theſe circumſtances to prejudice Mr. Allen, becauſe I now believe him, to be a loyal ſubject; but yet, a character thus circumſtanced was not the perſon under whom the General could expect the Loyaliſts would inliſt. Mr. Chalmers, a gentleman from Maryland, who came into the Britiſh army at Elk, though much reſpected in Maryland, was without any influence in Philadelphia. Colonel Clifton, if poſſible, had leſs influence, except among the Roman Catholics; and of theſe there were not 200 men capable of carrying a muſquet: beſides, here, as in New York, during the whole ſeaſon for recruiting, he ſuffered Waſhington's parties to ſurround his lines, and render it impoſſible to recruit in the country. Such were the gentlemen appointed, and ſuch the embarraſſments under which the recruiting ſervice laboured in Philadelphia; and yet the General acknowledges, that, during his ſhort ſtay in that city, where he found only 4482 males from 18 to 60 years of age, of whom near 1000 were Quakers, he raiſed 974 rank and file, and, officers included, upwards of 1100.

The General ſays nothing of Mr. Galloway's troop of Philadelphia light dragoons; it did not ſuit his purpoſe. That very *unpopular* gentleman offered to raiſe a regiment of horſe, but he could procure a warrant for raiſing a troop only. This corps was expeditiouſly raiſed: in two months they were complete, and ſo well diſciplined as to be reviewed by the General, and greatly applauded

for their diſcipline. It is known in that country, that his influence among the Loyaliſts was ſuch, that he could have raiſed a regiment in nearly the ſame time, notwithſtanding the embarraſſments under which the recruiting ſervice then laboured. But the General declined making uſe of Mr. Galloway's influence in the recruiting ſervice, and preferred to it that of an unpopular country tavern-keeper, for whom he thought his ſervants in the kitchen the moſt proper company. This man received a warrant to raiſe a troop, and now mixes with gentlemen of rank in the army. Such were the judicious appointments of the Commander in Chief in Philadelphia!

To the charge, that no ſtep was taken by the General to embody the friends of Government in New Jerſey, who were anxious to be employed in diſarming the diſaffected, and in defending the country when the army ſhould proceed in its other neceſſary operations, he anſwers,

Page 53.] "*I never heard of the anxiety and readineſs here expreſſed.*"

If the General never heard of the anxiety and readineſs here expreſſed, it was becauſe he would not. It is a fact which I have mentioned before, and will here again repeat, that upwards of fifty gentlemen, of well-known principle and untainted loyalty, ſome of them from the *diſloyal county of Monmouth*, came into the lines of Trenton, with deſign to offer their ſervices in the before-mentioned meaſures; but the General was inacceſſible; they could not, after ſeveral days attendance, procure an audience. Some of them returned home, chagrined and diſguſted, and others are now in New York, taking refuge under the protection of the King's forces. But if the General had really the reduction of the rebellion at heart, why did he not ſet up the King's ſtandard, and call on the Loyaliſts of that country to aſſiſt him in arms? Why did he reſt on his proclamation, with promiſing them protection, and then ſuffering that promiſe to be violated

lated in thouſands of inſtances? Did he expect that the Loyaliſts would impertinently offer their aſſiſtance to a General who would not deign to aſk it, and who ſuffered his troops to plunder the inhabitants, to a degree more exceſſive than ever was known, under a prudent General, in an enemy's country? Did he believe, that, by ſuch meaſures, he ſhould attach even the well-diſpoſed to the cauſe he was engaged in? Did he imagine that it was poſſible to execute his truſt, in reducing a country ſo extenſive, without making uſe of the well-affected force in it, and whilſt he was purſuing the moſt effectual meaſures to turn that force againſt himſelf? If he did, he acted upon principles contradicted by common ſenſe, and the practice of all other Generals who ever deſerved the applauſe of their country.

In page 54, the General next attempts to prove that the inhabitants of Philadelphia were not "*anxious* to promote the King's ſervice, even without carrying arms."

He tells, us, that labourers were wanted, to conſtruct the redoubts at Philadelphia; and he applied to Mr. Galloway to procure them. He preſumes Mr. Galloway exerted himſelf; and yet, "with all his aſſiduity, and the means made uſe of by the chief engineer," the whole number that could be prevailed on to aſſiſt him, amounted each day, upon an average, to no more than between 70 and 80.

This tranſaction, like every other, is groſsly miſrepreſented. Mr. Galloway was applied to, by the chief engineer, to procure the labourers. Near one hundred were immediately procured. The wages offered were 8d. *per diem*, and a ſalt ration; but for theſe the men would not labour. The common wages in the city were from 5s. 6d. to 6s. ſterling *per diem*. Beef was ſold at 2s. 6d. *a* 3s. *per* pound; mutton at 2s. *a* 2s. 6d. cheeſe at 3s. and bread at a price equally high. The men had families to feed. The General was ſolicited to raiſe their wages, but he obſtinately and inhumanly refuſed;

the men deſerted their work, and the officers declared they could not blame them. Very different was the conduct of Lord Cornwallis, when he applied to Mr. Galloway to repair the too long neglected dykes of the Province Iſland. Mr. Galloway recollecting the former conduct of the General, informed his Lordſhip, that he could not undertake the buſineſs, unleſs the men were to receive reaſonable wages; and that he ſhould aſk no more than he had given for the like work in time of peace, although the price of labour was riſen nearly two-thirds more. His Lordſhip without heſitation aſſented to the propoſal. Near fifty men were immediately procured, at a Spaniſh dollar *per diem*, a ſalt ration, and a pint of rum; the latter, becauſe they were obliged to work in water. The buſineſs was done in ſix days, much to his Lordſhip's ſatisfaction; and then, and not till then, could the chief engineer make any conſiderable progreſs in erecting the main battery againſt Mud Iſland fort.

In pages 59, 60, *the General endeavours to extenuate the plunder, and other enormities committed by the ſoldiery in America. He aſſerts, that "there never was leſs plunder, nor fewer enormities, committed by any army in the field; and intimates, that the newſpapers in America, like thoſe of other countries, are the vehicles of invention and calumny, upon which theſe enormities are grounded."*

I ſincerely wiſh, for the credit of human nature, that this repreſentation were juſt; but all, and more than I have ſaid in my Letters to a Nobleman, reſpecting indiſcriminate and exceſſive plunder, is known to thouſands within the Britiſh lines, and to a number of gentlemen now in England; and in reſpect to the rapes, the fact alledged does not depend on the credit of newſpapers. A ſolemn enquiry was made, and affidavits taken, by which it appears that no leſs than twenty-three were committed in one neighbourhood in New Jerſey; ſome of them on married women, in the preſence of their helpleſs huſbands; and others on daughters while the unhappy

happy parents, with unavailing tears and cries, could only deplore the ſavage brutality. Theſe affidavits are on record in America; and printed copies of them are now in London. Such were the meaſures purſued by the General, to reconcile his Majeſty's deluded ſubjects to his government, and to encourage the Loyaliſts to ſupport the cauſe of their Sovereign!

In page 61, *the General adduces the evidence of Major-general Grey, to prove that the Cheſapeak expedition occaſioned* "A POWERFUL DIVERSION IN FAVOUR OF THE NORTHERN ARMY."

How powerful this diverſion was, the world already knows; it loſt the very army it was intended to ſave, if it can be poſſible that ſuch was the intent. But I will more particularly conſider the force of the Major-general's evidence.

"*I think*," ſays the Major-general, "*a ſtronger diverſion could not have been made, than that of drawing General Waſhington, and the whole Continental army, near* 300 *miles off.*"

From this mode of expreſſion, the reader may poſſibly apprehend that Waſhington was drawn 300 miles more diſtant from the Northern army. But the Major-general could not poſſibly mean this; the fact being, that Waſhington was only drawn, except for a few days, from Quibbletown to the Schuylkill, 50 miles more diſtant; and, to perform this truly ridiculous diverſion, he carried his army, by ſea, at leaſt 700 miles, againſt trade-winds, and, as he confeſſes himſelf, through a "very difficult navigation." The conſequences were foreſeen by every man of common reflection. The carrying the main Britiſh force at ſo great a diſtance from the Northern colonies, inſpired the rebels with new hopes and ſpirits, and contributed greatly to increaſe their numbers, under Gates, againſt the Northern army. It waſted two months of the campaign, deſtroyed many, and rendered the remainder of the Britiſh horſes totally unfit for ſervice: and occaſioned the deſtruction of a number of veſſels and ſtores,

ſtores, which, "it ſeems," could not be removed from the head of Elk.

But to ſhew the folly of this extraordinary manœuvre, I will candidly lay before the public a true ſtate of the Britiſh and rebel force at this conjuncture, and their reſpective poſitions.

General Burgoyne was on his route from Canada to Albany, where Sir William Howe was ordered to form a junction of the two armies.

Waſhington was at Quibbletown, 200 miles diſtant from the place where the Northern army muſt meet the enemy, and where it was taken; the General's force was at New York, 40 miles nearer, and in a manner between the Northern army and Waſhington.

Waſhington's army could not have paſſed to Albany by water; he had not ſhipping: nor could it have marched by land in leſs than a fortnight, and that only by one road, leading through a gap of the mountain. General Howe had an immenſe fleet of men of war and tranſports, ſufficient to carry his whole force to Albany in *one week*.

Waſhington, when at Quibbletown, lay about nine miles from Brunſwick, with his front on the Rariton, which, at that time, and in that place, was not fordable, and his rear was acceſſible with eaſe. General Howe, at the ſame time at Brunſwick, (inſtead of marching to Hillſborough, on the ſouth ſide of the Rariton, as if dreading his force,) might have paſſed in a good road, on the north ſide, not more than 14 miles, and perfectly encompaſſed his enemy.

Waſhington's army was compoſed of new raiſed and undiſciplined troops, commanded by inexperienced officers; they were a corps which had been defeated in every action, ſtrangers to victory, and diſpirited. Sir William Howe's army were Britons and Germans, perfectly diſciplined, and commanded by brave and experienced officers, who had carried victory with them wherever they had trod, whoſe ſpirit had been exalted by numerous and recent ſucceſſes.

Waſhington

Waſhington commanded, by Sir William Howe's own exaggerated account, only 10,000 men; and, by his own returns, it appears he had under his immediate command, at New York, 40,784; and when we look at his own diſtribution of the force neceſſary for his garriſons, we find 7100 ſufficient for that purpoſe; ſo that 33,684 remained to be led againſt his enemy.

Upon this ſtate of facts, it is natural to aſk the following queſtions:

Did Sir William Howe imagine that he was taking the neceſſary meaſures to fulfil his orders to join the Northern army at Albany, by leading his own army round Cape Charles, 350 miles more diſtant from Albany than he was at New York?

Did he really imagine that leading Waſhington, already 200 miles from Saratoga, from Quibbletown to the neighbourhood of Philadelphia, could poſſibly be a diverſion of the leaſt importance to the Northern army? If Waſhington had intended to have co-operated with Gates againſt the Northern army, could Sir William Howe think that he ſhould prevent it by hiding his army in the ocean and by his circuitous route to the Cheſapeak, going 600 miles from Saratoga, and leaving Waſhington within 200 miles of it?

If the General really intended to prevent Waſhington from aſſiſting Gates, why did he not take a poſt between them in New Jerſey, on the only road and paſs, through which Waſhington could march?

If he really intended to put an end to the rebellion, by defeating the main army in the field, why did he not lead 25,000 men from Brunſwick, on the north ſide of the Rariton, and attack Waſhington's 10,000 men in his unfortified camp? Or, if Waſhington had been ſo fortified as to render an aſſault improper, why did he not, with ſuch a ſuperior force, ſurround, and, by cutting off his ſupplies, with which he was very ſcantily furniſhed, ſtarve him? All theſe meaſures were pointed out by com-

mon

mon ſenſe. The benefits which would have accrued from them were obvious, and of the greateſt importance to the ſuppreſſion of the rebellion; while that which he purſued did not afford the leaſt proſpect of a ſingle advantage to the ſervice, and beſides was attended with an immenſe unneceſſary expence, was pregnant with numerous difficulties and dangers, and promiſed the ruin of the campaign.

Major-general Grey further ſays, "I do not think there was any *one object* which would have tempted General Waſhington to riſque a general action ſo much as the fear of loſing the capital of Pennſylvania."

This I believe to be true: but, what does it avail in the defence of the General's conduct? Nothing. It contains a full condemnation of his Cheſapeak expedition. For Waſhington would have fought between Hillſborough and that city from the ſame motive. He engaged Sir William Howe's army at Brandywine for that reaſon, and he would have done it in New Jerſey. Why then did not Sir William Howe, having his boats and pontoons with him all prepared at Brunſwick, paſs his army from that place to the Delaware? If Waſhington had come from his pretended ſtrong poſt to attack the Britiſh army, he muſt have fought his enemy upon equal, if not diſadvantageous terms, as Sir William Howe might have choſe his ground. If he had remained in his camp, the city of Philadelphia, and all his magazines of military and other ſtores, muſt have fallen without oppoſition into the General's hands.

To the queſtion, "Was there any probability of bringing the war to a termination that campaign, without forcing General Waſhington to a general engagement?" the Major-general anſwers, "Certainly not."

Here the General appears to be ſenſible of the great importance of bringing Waſhington to a battle. Why then did he not take one rational ſtep to effect it? Was it poſſible that he could imagine, that his taking

taking poſt on the ſouth ſide of the Rariton would bring an inferior enemy down from his advantageous poſt, acroſs an unfordable river, to attack him? Why did he not march upon the ſame ſide of the river on which Waſhington lay, and offer him battle? Waſhington muſt have fought in a little time, or ſtarved. Or, why did he not make a feint, by paſſing towards Philadelphia? This muſt have brought Waſhington from his poſt, or he muſt have given up the "capital of Pennſylvania," for which the General himſelf believed he would fight. Surely any of theſe meaſures were preferable to the unpromiſing and unfortunate expedition round by ſea to the head of Elk.

It will not be thought a digreſſion, ſhould I here give the reader a deſcription of the great advantages which a ſuperior army muſt have over an inferior, in their operations in New Jerſey. The province is bounded on the eaſt and ſouth by the North River, New York Bay, and the Ocean; on the weſt, by the Bay and River Delaware; and on the north, it runs into the uninhabited mountains, forming a peninſula to the ſouth. The waters incloſing it on the eaſt, ſouth, and weſt, are not more than 50 miles diſtant from each other, and until the month of June are never fordable; nor even then, except in the Delaware above Trenton. And there are very few countries to be found, leſs difficult and better adapted for military operations. What then is the caſe of an inferior army in a country thus ſituated, when a ſuperior force is properly led againſt it? If it ſhould march to avoid its enemy ſouthward, it runs into a ſnare from whence it cannot eſcape. If it turns to the north, it muſt combat every difficulty which mountains deſtitute of proviſions can afford; and if he attempts either on the eaſt or weſt to eſcape, he may be attacked in the moment of croſſing a conſiderable river. And yet the General, although he had his truly contemptible enemy in this very country, ſuffered him to croſs the Delaware with his heavy baggage and artillery in 1776; and in June 1777 ſhamefully retreated before him, ſuffering him

conſtantly

conſtantly to haraſs the Britiſh rear from Brunſwick to Amboy. And what was yet more abſurd, he left this ſcene of operations, ſo full of advantages to himſelf, and miſchievous to his enemy, in order to draw him into a field more extenſive, where none of them exiſted.

The Major-general further ſays, "With the force Sir William Howe had under his command, I think, if General Waſhington had a wiſh, it was for him to have gone up the North River."

This is altogether ill-founded. Waſhington dreaded the army's paſſing up the North River. He knew too well the difficulties he muſt have to encounter in following it. He knew the Britiſh army would be tranſported with eaſe, and in a ſhort time, by water; and that his own muſt march over mountains, and through ravines and ſtrong defiles; and that he muſt receive his proviſions from the ſouthern Colonies. And he alſo knew, that it would depreſs the ſpirits of the eaſtern militia, prevent them in a good degree from joining Gates, and infallibly ſave the northern army. Such being his fixed opinion; when it was ſuggeſted to him that Sir William Howe was gone to the Cheſapeak, he would not believe it, and contended that the meaſure was too abſurd to be poſſible. Agreeably to this opinion he acted. When Sir William Howe with the fleet ſailed from the Hook *ſouthward*, Waſhington moved his army from Quibbletown *northward*, in order to be more conveniently ſituated to follow the Britiſh General up the North River. He believed the ſailing from the Hook to be a feint, and expected each day that he ſhould hear of the General's return, and of his ſailing with his army towards Albany. And as ſoon as he heard that the Britiſh fleet was at the Capes of Delaware, and not before, he marched ſouthward; but upon receiving accounts that the fleet had again ſtood out to ſea, ſtill perſuaded that Sir William Howe could not act ſo contrary to reaſon as to go up the Cheſapeak to Philadelphia, and that he would yet go to the northward,

northward, he returned to his northern poſt, which he did not leave until it was perfectly aſcertained that the Britiſh fleet was near the head of Elk. This conduct of the rebel General agreed with his declared ſentiments, and proves the reverſe of the Major-general's opinion.

Page 62.] "*My reaſon for going by ſea fully ſet forth in my Narrative, page* 16."

The only reaſons aſſigned by the General to his Sovereign, in his letters, were the difficulties he ſhould meet with in croſſing the Delaware. To theſe I have already replied. Since that letter, he has diſcovered a number of others, equally ill-founded; and for theſe I am referred to the Narrative.

Page 16.] "*To have attacked Waſhington in that ſtrong poſt (Quibbletown,) I muſt neceſſarily have made a conſiderable circuit of the country.*"

The utmoſt diſtance of this circuit would not have exceeded fifteen miles, about ſix miles further than to Hillſborough. Neither Quibbletown nor Hillſborough is ten miles from Brunſwick; ſo that this *conſiderable circuit* of country might have been performed in one day. A circuit which will bear no compariſon with that he adopted in its ſtead, and which he took by ſea and land, to fight Waſhington at Brandywine on ground equally ſtrong.

Page 16.] "*I did not think it adviſeable to loſe ſo much time as muſt have been employed in that march during the intenſe heat of the ſeaſon.*"

The time which would have been loſt in that march could not have been more than ten hours;—the time waſted in his Cheſapeak circuit was three months.

Ibid.] "*Excluſive of this conſideration, our return muſt have been through an exhauſted country, where there was no poſſibility of keeping up the communication with Brunſwick.*"

The reader, by this account, may be led to think that Quibbletown is one hundred miles from Brunſwick, when in fact it is but ten at moſt;——

and the communication might have been as eaſily kept up with Quibbletown, as with Hillſborough; —and beſides, as Sir William Howe had only 11,000 men with him, he might have had as many more to have ſecured the communication, if he had wanted them.

In my Letters I have aſſerted, that "in the midſt of victory the ardour of his troops was ſuppreſſed;" and the General ſuppoſes, page 62, "that the author alludes to his conduct near the lines of Brooklyn, and introduces the evidence of Lord Cornwallis and Major-general Grey to diſprove it." Here the General is miſtaken. I did not allude to his conduct at Brooklyn, but at the Brandywine, Goſhen, and at Germantown. Men of the firſt reputation for integrity at New York declare, that this was alſo the caſe at Brooklyn and the White Plains; but, as I have not treated of the General's conduct at thoſe places, I ſhall take no further notice of this.

In the Letters, I have ſaid, "that at Brunſwick, Lord Cornwallis was upon the heels of the enemy; the deſtruction of a bridge over the Rariton ſaved them only for a few hours; their further ſecurity was owing to the orders received by that nobleman to halt at Brunſwick."

To diſprove theſe facts he again, page 65, refers to the teſtimony of Earl Cornwallis. On this teſtimony I ſhall make no remarks: but content myſelf with only obſerving, that the facts I have alledged are ratified not only by the univerſal report of the country, but by the General's own letter of the 20th December 1776, written at the time when the tranſaction happened, to give information to his Sovereign, when the General did not think of his Defence. And therefore I preſume, the Public will give full credit to it. The words of the letter are:

"In the Jerſeys, upon the approach of the van of Lord Cornwallis's corps to Brunſwick, by a forced march on the firſt inſtant, the enemy went off *moſt precipitately* to Prince Town: and had they not prevented

prevented the paſſage of the Rariton, by breaking a part of Brunſwick bridge, *ſo great was the confuſion among them, that their army muſt inevitably have been cut to pieces.*"

"*My firſt deſign extending no further than to get poſſeſſion of Eaſt New Jerſey,* LORD CORNWALLIS HAD ORDERS NOT TO ADVANCE BEYOND BRUNSWICK, WHICH OCCASIONED HIM TO DISCONTINUE HIS PURSUIT."

Here every fact I have alledged, and which the General has denied, ſtands fully confeſſed by himſelf; and when it is known that the Rariton is fordable at Brunſwick at every receſs of the tide, no man can doubt but the ſpirit and activity of his Lordſhip would have led him, had not his orders been——"not to advance beyond Brunſwick," to have purſued an enemy thus precipitately "flying," thus ready to be "cut to pieces," and having ſo "*difficult*" a river to paſs as the Delaware.

The advantages which muſt have been derived from continuing the purſuit were ſo momentous, and obvious, that we cannot ſuppoſe an Officer ſo active, who had purſued his enemy more than 90 miles, reducing their numbers from 18,000 to 3,000 men, would have diſcontinued his purſuit at the moment that enemy had before him all the difficulties of croſſing a conſiderable river.

Page 67.] *Waſhington's force at this time (when he was followed to Trenton) conſiſted of* 6000 *men, excluſive of Lee's corps of* 4000; *General Waſhington loſt no time in croſſing his artillery and heavy baggage over the Delaware at Trenton, before we could move from Brunſwick. He alſo croſſed part of his troops, keeping a corps on the eaſt ſide to obſerve our motions.*

This paragraph contains three miſtakes; one of them, I truſt, the General himſelf will confeſs. He here ſays that Waſhington's force conſiſted of 6000 men. In his Narrative, page 8, he acknowledges that force to be only 3000 when it attacked Colonel Rhal at Trenton. He alſo aſſerts that Lee's

corps conſiſted of 4000 men. In his letter * to the Secretary of State, giving an account of Lee's capture, which happened only a few days before, he ſays it conſiſted of 2000 men. Theſe contradictions in his opinions, at the time he was writing to the Secretary of State, and when he is making his defence before the Public, the reader will be at no loſs to account for. However, the truth is, that Waſhington, by his own returns made on the day before he croſſed the Delaware, had no more than 3300; and a number of theſe deſerted immediately after. Lee's corps did not amount to 1500; and on his capture, many of them deſerted; ſo that when Waſhington made his great, and what many thought would be, his laſt effort to recover his deſperate affairs, he could only bring over againſt Colonel Rhal 2800 men, ordering Cadwallader with his brigade of 500 men to croſs the Delaware, and to attack Bordentown, where only 80 Heſſian grenadiers were left by Colonel Donop. The ice in the Delaware prevented this. And yet Sir William Howe ſuffered Waſhington with this army, then the whole Continental force of America, to take from him all Eaſt and Weſt Jerſey, except his poſts on the Rariton, and that too at a time when he confeſſes in his Narrative, p. 41, that his "*great ſucceſſes had intimidated the leaders of the rebellion, and nearly induced a general ſubmiſſion.*"

Nor is it a fact, that "Waſhington loſt no time in croſſing his artillery over the Delaware at Trenton before we could move from Brunſwick." Waſhington believed that the Britiſh General had no deſign of moving his army from Eaſt to Weſt New Jerſey. Upon what Waſhington's belief was founded, I know not. But it is certain, that he acted as if he was acquainted with the General's firſt intentions. That he had, if we may credit his own letters now in Britain, copies of the returns of the Britiſh army, is a fact. It is therefore highly

* See his Letter, dated Dec. 20th, 1776.

probable,

probable, this reſolution might *inadvertently* tranſpire through the ſame channel. Poſſeſſed with this belief, Waſhington did not leave Princeton until the Britiſh van was within three miles of it. Nor had he prepared boats at Trenton to tranſport his army over the Delaware. The ſame boats which Lord Cornwallis ſays, in his teſtimony, "he had hopes of finding at Coryel's Ferry" did not get down to Trenton until late in the ſame night that the Britiſh army *ſlept* at Princeton. And therefore it was, that Waſhington did not begin to tranſport his baggage and artillery over the Delaware, until twelve o'clock that night; and could not get his baggage and troops over, until a few minutes before the arrival of the Britiſh army, which had loitered ſeventeen hours within twelve miles of Trenton. For this confidence of Waſhington in the indolence of the Britiſh General, his principal officers who were not in his ſecret councils blamed him. And it was upon this occaſion that Weeden, a rebel General, wrote the letter I have mentioned in page 48 of the Letters to a Nobleman, declaring, "that General Howe had a mortgage on Waſhington's army for ſome time, but had not yet foreclоſed it."

It is alſo a miſtake, that Waſhington "croſſed a part of his troops over the Delaware, keeping a corps on the eaſt ſide to obſerve our motions;" no corps was croſſed over until the morning of the day on which the Britiſh army took up their quarters at Trenton.

Page 66.] "*The troops of the left column were not in their cantonments in the evening of the march to Princeton until dark, and thoſe of the right column not till ſome hours after dark.*"

How illuſive is this! I have aſſerted that the army arrived at Princeton at four o'clock in the afternoon. This fact the General does not deny; but to evade it we are told, when the two columns were ſettled in their cantonments. How long it was before the two columns were in their canton-

 ments,

ments, I know not; perhaps the ſame indolence prevailed in cantoning the army as in the other operations. But that both the columns were Britiſh troops, perfectly relieved from fatigue by their ſtay at Brunſwick, and zealous for action, and either of them ſuperior in numbers to the flying and panic-ſtruck enemy, are truths that cannot be concealed or evaded. And therefore it is evident, that they eaſily might have overtaken, in the courſe of ſeventeen hours, the enemy, who were within twelve miles of their quarters, and that in the very act of croſſing the Delaware; that river, of which the difficulties in croſſing have been ſo magnified to ſerve another purpoſe.

Page 67.] *The cauſe of not marching earlier the following day was, that the enemy had broke down the bridge which could not be ſooner repaired, and rendered fit for the paſſage of artillery.*

This bridge was over a creek which an Engliſh hunter would leap with eaſe. It was within a mile of the Britiſh head-quarters, its banks ſloping to the water's edge with the gentleſt declivity, and fordable at the high-road, and in twenty other places within half a mile of it. The bridge itſelf, which was only uſed occaſionally by the inhabitants on heavy falls of rain, might have been repaired in one hour, and at four o'clock in the morning as well as ten o'clock in the day—there was nothing to prevent it. There are people now in London perfectly acquainted with this formidable bridge and creek.

Ibid.] *To account for his not croſſing the Delaware after his reduced and panic-ſtruck enemy, at a time when he had brought the country nearly to a "general ſubmiſſion," he again refers to Lord Cornwallis's evidence, who tells us, "as the Delaware was not fordable, and we could get no boats, it was certainly impracticable."*

That the Delaware could not have been paſſed at this time without boats or rafts, is true. But the General muſt tell us, why he did not conſtruct rafts

rafts or pontoons, which might have been done in a few days with the materials in Trenton. This is a queſtion to which the Public will expect a ſatisfactory, and not an evaſive anſwer; eſpecially as the croſſing the Delaware at this time was moſt critical and momentous, and muſt have put an immediate end to the rebellion.

At this time, the models of Government in the rebel States were ſcarcely formed, and their authority by no means eſtabliſhed. Every member of the rebel State of New Jerſey had fled out of the province; and the Congreſs themſelves, with the utmoſt precipitation, had alſo fled from Pennſylvania into Maryland. A univerſal panic, with a deſire of immediate ſubmiſſion, then prevailed throughout all North America. Waſhington's army was reduced to 3000 men. The city of Philadelphia was diſtant no more than two days eaſy march; it was intirely defenceleſs; 3000 Britiſh might have been ſpared to have taken immediate poſſeſſion of it; while the other, and by far greater part of the Britiſh army, might have been employed in the final deſtruction of the rebel force and magazines. The Britiſh fleet, or ſuch a part of it as might be thought neceſſary, with tranſports loaded with ſtores and proviſions for the army, might have ſailed round in one week, and, without a ſingle obſtruction*, have paſſed up to Philadelphia, which every circumſtance demonſtrated to be the moſt proper quarters for the army in winter. Had this meaſure, which common ſenſe ſo evidently dictated, been purſued, the reader will determine, whether it would not have ended the rebellion, preſerved the Northern army, prevented a war with France and Spain, ſaved the millions which have been expended, and preſerved the nation from thoſe im-

* At this time Mud Iſland fort was not built, the chevaux-de-frize and chain were not made, nor were their fire-rafts or water-guard in any kind of force.

minent dangers and diſtreſſes which lately threatened the Independence of the Britiſh nation.

Page 68.] *The General again adduces the teſtimony of Lord Cornwallis and Sir George Oſborne, to vindicate his conduct in having taken Trenton into the chain of cantonments, and for poſting the Heſſian troops, with the 42d regiment, there and at Bordentown, under the command of Colonel Donop.*

Here he attempts to evade the force of the charge againſt him. I have not cenſured his conduct for "taking Trenton into his chain of cantonments." Seeing he *would* not croſs the Delaware, this was a neceſſary meaſure. It was neceſſary to cover New Jerſey, which he had then conquered, and might have been ſecured, had he taken one proper ſtep for that purpoſe. I have only blamed him, 1*mo*, for giving the command of his frontier cantonments to foreigners, who did not underſtand the language or policy of the country; and 2*do*, and principally, for leaving the weakeſt command, or feweſt number of men, next to the main force of the enemy, and the ſtrongeſt and greateſt command, where there was no enemy to fear.

The reader will here permit me to refer him to a peruſal of Lord Cornwallis's evidence, where he will find, that no fact, which his Lordſhip aſſerts, tends to contradict any of the charges in this paragraph; all that he ſays, relates to the covering of Trenton, which certainly was neceſſary. But had his Lordſhip been conſulted what force ought to have been left at Trenton, or whether it was proper to place foreigners in the frontier poſts, I am confident he would have adviſed againſt either of thoſe meaſures; and had he been aſked by the General, whether the greateſt or weakeſt force ought to have been placed in the frontier cantonments, he would, without any heſitation, have adviſed the greateſt.

Page 69.] *Sir George Oſborne tells us, that, after the misfortune of Trenton, Col. Donop acquainted him, that if Col. Rhal had executed the orders he had delivered him from Sir William Howe, which were, to erect*

erect redoubts at the poſt of Trenton, it would have been impoſſible to have forced Rhal's brigade, before he could come to his aſſiſtance from Bordentown.

If this was the declaration of Colonel Donop, it can only convince us, when the real facts are known, of the impropriety of placing Heſſian commanders in the moſt dangerous poſt, with a command ſo weak, to oppoſe the whole force of the enemy. The truth is, that Colonel Donop, when Trenton was taken, was drawn down to Mount Holly, twelve miles diſtant from Bordentown, and eighteen from Trenton, with his whole corps, except 80 grenadiers, contrary to the information received from Mr. Galloway. This gentleman told him, that the enemy's force at Mount Holly, which he ſuppoſed, from the information of thoſe who had groſsly impoſed on him, to be 3000 men, were no more than 450, men and boys, prevailed on to make a ſhow, and to draw him from his poſt, while Trenton was attacked. This information the Colonel diſregarded; the conſequence of which was, that Colonel Donop was not at Bordentown, from whence he could ſupport Colonel Rhal; and therefore Colonel Donop told Sir George what was not a fact, to apologize for his own unmilitary conduct.

But if the Colonel had received orders to direct Colonel Rhal to fortify Trenton, one would imagine the General had taken the ſame precaution in reſpect to Bordentown. And Colonel Donop acted the ſame unmilitary part with Colonel Rhal, and indeed worſe; for he left his poſt, although equally expoſed to the enemy, who had boats to croſs their whole force over, to the aſſault of either poſt, then unfortified. Waſhington was not unmindful of theſe military blunders, and therefore ſent his contemptible body of new raiſed militia, moſt of them boys, to draw Colonel Donop from his poſt, while he ſhould attack it, as well as Trenton; and nothing ſaved Bordentown, at the time Trenton was taken, but the ice in the Delaware, which prevented

a corps of 500 men, under Cadwallader, from paſſing that river.

Had Colonels Donop and Rhal received orders from the General to fortify their reſpective poſts, is it credible that officers of their experience would have preſumed to diſobey them? I ſhould think not, when their own ſafety and honour depended on their obedience. If Colonel Donop had received ſuch orders, it was his duty to have ſeen them executed; if he did not, why did not the General call him to anſwer for ſo great a breach of duty? Why did he afterwards intruſt a man, who had tranſgreſſed the military law in a point ſo important, with the important command againſt Red Bank? But there are other queſtions, to which we may call on the General for explicit anſwers. Were the orders to Colonel Donop in writing, or not? If they were in writing, why are they not produced? If they were not, they certainly ought to have been, in a matter of ſo much conſequence. But further. Why did not the General ſee that thoſe redoubts were built before he withdrew his force from Trenton? If they were neceſſary at all, they were immediately neceſſary. The aſſaults upon Trenton might have been made the next day after the enemy had left it, as well as the eleventh. The General, with his whole army, remained on the ſpot, from the 8th to the 14th of December; and in half of that time the redoubts at both poſts might have been completed, and the ſubſequent diſgraces and miſfortunes prevented. The General, therefore, muſt find a better apology for thoſe two blunders; of leaving his frontier poſts, which were the moſt expoſed, and in ſight of the whole force of the enemy, in a ſtate altogether defenceleſs, and with the ſmalleſt number of troops of any of his cantonments; blunders that would diſgrace the weakeſt officer in his army.

Ibid.] *Waſhington, after Lee's corps joined him, had never leſs than* 8000 *men.*

General

General Lee was taken, on the 12th of December, by Colonel Harcourt, at the head of his corps, near Trenton, on their way to join Washington. A few days after, the scattered remains of that corps, not consisting of 700 men, joined Washington, who, reinforced by that corps, attacked Trenton; and the General confesses, in his Narrative, page 8, when he intends to throw the blame on Colonel Rhal, that "he was *credibly* informed, that the numbers of the enemy did not exceed 3000;" but in his Observations, when he has another purpose in view, he asserts that Washington had never less than 8000 men, after the junction of Lee's corps. The General did not recollect, at the time he made use of this argument, that it proves too much for his own reputation; and that, if it vindicates it in one case, it more strongly condemns it in another. For if Washington's force "was *not less than* 8000" *men*, when he left Trenton with only 1200, under Colonel Rhal, in a state entirely unfortified, to oppose that 8000, did his military knowledge lead him to believe that the post of Trenton was safe? Did it justify his not seeing that post in a state of defence, at least for one day, before he left it; before he drew the main British army from it? I wish some reflections, yet more to the General's disadvantage than those I have enumerated, may not obtrude themselves upon the mind of the candid enquirer. If there were 8000 men within sight of the defenceless post of Trenton, did General Howe intend to sacrifice that post to the wicked designs of a faction, combined against the honour of his Sovereign, and the happiness of his country? Or shall we impute it to his ignorance in military service?

But yet even this excuse his friend Major-general Grey will not suffer us to admit. He declares, page 96, that the "division of the army, before the battle of Brandywine, was a *masterly movement*, *deceived the enemy*, and brought on an action with almost certainty of success; we cannot, therefore, impute

impute ſo groſs a blunder to ignorance. The reader will aſcribe it to another cauſe.

I have aſſerted, that Waſhington was encamped at Quibbletown, about nine miles from Brunſwick, with fewer than 6000 undiſciplined and badly appointed troops, which, with a corps of 2000 men, under General Sullivan at Prince Town, compoſed his whole force. To this the General anſwers,

Ibid.] *From the intelligence I then had, and which I have not ſince had reaſon to doubt, Waſhington had not leſs than* 10,000 *men in his camp, on the hill above Quibbletown.*

The General ſhews no want of ingenuity in ſtating his own numbers, and thoſe of his enemy. In treating of the former, he gives us only his effective rank and file, excluſive of officers, an important part of his force; but in ſpeaking of the rebel army, he always extends his ideas to its whole force. This is ingeniouſly adapted to miſlead men unacquainted with ſuch calculation. However, allowing him what he contends for, and ſuppoſing that he had "11,000 fighting men," and Waſhington 10,000, yet the former were veteran troops, inured to victory, and eager for action; and the latter were new raiſed and undiſciplined, and at leaſt one-half militia. Was he afraid of attacking Waſhington with ſuch men? If he was, why did he not add to their numbers 11,000 more? His own returns will prove, that the numbers then under his immediate command, were not leſs than 35,000.

Page 70.] *His (Waſhington's) camp was to the full as inacceſſible in the rear as in the front, and an attack upon his right flank (from every account I could get) would have been ſtill more hazardous.*

The ſurveyor of the county, who knew the ſpot on which Waſhington was encamped, was at New York when the General proceeded to Hillſborough; he was attending on the army. He had drawn a chart of the roads round Waſhington's camp; and he communicated his ideas to General Skinner, who had conſtant acceſs to the General. He was ordered

ordered to hold himſelf in readineſs to attend the army in Jerſey; but he was left at New York, without any notice of its movement to Hillſborough. Of theſe facts, whenever called upon, he will make ſolemn affidavit; and further, that Waſhington's camp was acceſſible both in the rear and on the right flank, on higher and more commanding ground.

Ibid. | *Waſhington was certainly induced to believe that my intention was to attack him; and had he not been perfectly ſatisfied with the ſtrength of his poſt, he would not have remained ſo long in it.*

It was impoſſible that Waſhington could conceive, from the movement of the Britiſh army, that the General intended to attack him. It did not in the leaſt indicate ſuch deſign, but manifeſtly the reverſe; indeed, it rather diſcovered a fear in the General, of an attack from the rebel army. Could Waſhington, when General Howe, with all the appearance of caution and fear, in his whole march from Brunſwick to Hillſborough, and during his ſtay at that poſt, kept the Rariton, an unfordable river, between him and the poſt of his enemy, a ſituation from which he could neither attack nor be attacked, poſſibly believe he intended to attack him? It was this unmilitary conduct which encouraged Waſhington to remain in his camp, becauſe he knew he was ſafe while Sir William Howe remained thus poſted. Had the General wiſhed to have induced Waſhington to believe he intended to bring on an action, there was one obvious and infallible mode of doing it. A march of five or ſix miles would have carried the army to Waſhington's right flank or rear. It would then have been poſted between Waſhington and all his reſources; it would have cut him off from his magazines of proviſion, his military ſtores, and his boats, then lying ſome within ſeventeen, and all within thirty miles of the Britiſh poſt. In this caſe, Waſhington muſt have deſerted his camp, or ſtarved; and if he had moved, the General might

have attacked, or purſued him to his boats, to which the Britiſh army would have been many miles nearer than Waſhington, as he muſt have taken a conſiderable circuit to have reached them, and to have avoided an action, ſuppoſing it to have been practicable. But inſtead of this, the General did not move his army towards the Delaware, far enough to induce a belief that he intended either to croſs it, to get in the enemy's rear, or to cut him off from his ſupplies.

From page 71 to 96, *the General has introduced the teſtimony of Sir Andrew Snape Hammond, to apologize for not going up the Delaware, when he arrived with his fleet at the Capes of that Bay.*

It would be a tedious taſk, and little entertaining to the reader, ſhould I travel through all the miſtakes contained in this teſtimony, reſpecting the numerous "ſhoals, and rapidity of the tides" in the Delaware; the force of Waſhington at Willmington; the narrowneſs of the channel at Newcaſtle; the difficulties of landing the troops, and the great ſtrength of the rebel water-guard.

I will, therefore, content myſelf with a few brief obſervations on the whole. The *ſhoals* are to be ſeen in Fiſher's chart of the Delaware. *The tide* does not run two miles and an half in an hour. As to the *narrowneſs of the channel* at Newcaſtle, every ſkilful mariner, who has ſailed up the Delaware, knows, that from the Pea-patch below, to Marcus Hook above that town, a diſtance of 20 miles, it is at leaſt two miles in width. The ſtrength of Waſhington, at Willmington, was perfectly viſionary; becauſe it is known he was not at that time in Pennſylvania: And there are a number of gentlemen, now in London, who can prove that the fort at Mud Iſland was in an unfiniſhed and defenceleſs ſtate, and poſſeſſed by 130 militia only; that the water-guard was unprepared and unmanned, and the chain not finiſhed; and that there are a variety of places between the Bite of Newcaſtle and Marcus Hook, perfectly adapted to the landing

of

of an army with the utmoſt eaſe. Of this, Sir Andrew, in his croſs examination, notwithſtanding all the imaginary difficulties he had before enumerated, makes a full confeſſion; for, in page 87, he candidly declares, that he "never pretended to deny the practicability of landing an army in the Delaware." But, to put this matter beyond diſpute, I need only remind the Public, that the ſame fleet which Sir William Howe has endeavoured to perſuade us would be in danger from the difficulties in the navigation, and the rebel force, by his own orders, ſhortly after, when Waſhington had poſſeſſion of the country on both ſides, did ſail up the ſame river *uninjured* and *unmoleſted*, and in leſs than half the time it had taken to ſail up the Cheſapeak, when Waſhington's troops were in poſſeſſion of both banks of the river, when the water-guard was prepared, and in complete force.

Pages 104 and 105 *are partly employed in an attempt to prove, there was no time loſt in ſtopping the banks of Province Iſland, to enable the workmen to erect the batteries againſt Mud Iſland.*

To ſupport the charge of neglect, I ſhall apply to the General's own declarations; by which it will appear, that the city of Philadelphia was in the General's poſſeſſion on the 26th of September *, and that the batteries were opened againſt Mud Iſland on the 15th of November, exactly ſeven weeks after †. What were the carpenters and working parties employed in during this time? We are told they were repairing the dykes, and ſtopping out the tides. If the engineer employed them in that labour, when he had liberty to procure artiſts, he was very abſurd. This buſineſs is a particular art, and to be performed only by experienced men. Their wages are from 7s. 6d.

* See Sir William Howe's Letter to Lord George Germain, of the 10th of October, 1777

† See Obſervations, p. 105.

to 10s. *per diem*, while the wages of an upland ditcher is only 2s.; and I have known a maſter-artiſt ſent for from Virginia, and paid 150*l.* *per annum* ſalary. Hence it was that the carpenters and working parties, if they were employed in repairing the dykes, laboured in vain, in a buſineſs that they knew nothing about; but the truth is, they were as fruitleſsly employed in mud and water, to erect the batteries. This occaſioned the application to Mr. Galloway, by Lord Cornwallis, who, as is before mentioned, had them repaired in ſix days. The number of men employed by him, were upwards of forty.

An attempt is made, in page 106, to vindicate the General's conduct, in not attacking the rebel army at White Marſh. "*I had*, ſays he, *the beſt intelligence that the enemy's poſt was not aſſailable in the rear.*"

The guides who attended the General in this truly ridiculous expedition, and who lived from their infancy on the ſpot, and many others, will prove, on oath, that the ground in Waſhington's rear commanded his camp; and it is not leſs true, that he was prepared, at a moment's notice, of the General's movement towards his rear, for flight. His heavy baggage was ſent off toward Skippack, and his light was in readineſs for a precipitate movement. Men of undoubted reputation, within his lines at the time, have confirmed theſe facts.

But the General here again calls to his aid the teſtimony of Major-general Grey, who ſays, "I think an attack on the enemy, ſo very ſtrongly ſituated as they were at White Marſh, would have been highly imprudent." Did the Major-general ever reconnoitre the rear of Waſhington's camp? Was he ever on, or near that ground? He does not aſſert it; and the truth is, he never was. May he not then have been miſtaken in his opinion? He in the next page as poſitively aſſerts, that the war was carried on, "in the ſtrongeſt country

country in the world, with almoſt an unanimous people to defend it;" and in both of theſe opinions, there are now but few men who do not know that he is groſsly miſtaken.

I have ſaid, that the General "ſupinely ſuffered himſelf to be ſurpriſed at Germantown." To diſprove this charge, we are referred to Sir George Oſborne's teſtimony; and, when we candidly examine what he has ſaid on the ſubject, we find it rather ſupports than diſproves it. All that Sir George has ſaid of the General, is, that he ordered him to move in front of the line of infantry; and told him, he "might expect the enemy at day-break."

This only proves, that the General had ſome ſuſpicions of the enemy's deſign; but not that he had, in conſequence of that ſuſpicion, given the neceſſary orders to the army, to prepare them for receiving the enemy. If he really believed he ſhould be attacked, he is yet more culpable than I had imagined; for it is evident, from the teſtimony of his own witneſs, that no ſuch orders were given. Four different queſtions were put to Sir George, in order to draw from him his opinion on the ſurpriſe of the army; all of which he declined to anſwer. If he did believe the army was not ſurpriſed, would not the juſtice due to the General, have induced him to have declared it? And, as he declined it, is there not what amounts to the ſtrongeſt preſumption, that he could not deny it without violating his honour? But if the General really gave the neceſſary orders to the ſeveral officers of his army to prevent a ſurpriſe, all his Aides de Camp, and his Secretary were in London during the examination of his witneſſes, why then did he not prove ſuch orders by them? His honour, his military character demanded it; and yet we find he prudently avoided to examine them on the ſubject.

In the Letters to a Nobleman, page 86 to 89, I have faithfully deſcribed the diſtreſſed ſituation of the rebel army at the Valley Forge, and charged

the General with a high breach of his duty to his Sovereign, in not attacking or beſieging it, and by that means ſaving his country from all its ſubſequent misfortunes. As this is a high charge, the Public will excuſe me if I repeat it at large, and then conſider his anſwer.

"Here (at the Valley Forge) Waſhington lay all the winter and ſpring, encountering difficulties which language can ſcarcely deſcribe. His army labouring under bad appointments, almoſt in every reſpect; his troops in a manner naked, in the moſt inclement ſeaſon of the year, having no ſalt proviſions, and little ſalt to eat with their freſh; often on ſhort allowance in reſpect to both; rapidly waſting by ſickneſs, that raged with extreme mortality in all his different hoſpitals, and without any of the capital medicines to relieve them. His army was likewiſe diminiſhed by conſtant deſertions, in companies from ten to fifty at a time; hence in three months his number was reduced to leſs than 4000 men.

"Waſhington's army continued in this weak ſtate from December till May; while the Britiſh troops, who had the beſt appointments, and were in high health and ſpirits, lay in Philadelphia, in a great meaſure inactive, ſuffering the rebels to diſtreſs the loyal inhabitants on every ſide of the Britiſh lines, to deſtroy their mills, ſeize their grain, their horſes, their cattle; impriſon, whip, brand, and kill the unhappy people, who, devoted to the cauſe of their Sovereign, at every riſque, were daily ſupplying the army, navy, and loyal inhabitants within the lines, with every neceſſary and luxury that the country afforded."

To the charge thus made, with ſo many circumſtances preciſely defined, the General, as upon many other occaſions, contents himſelf with making only a general anſwer. He does not preſume to deny one of the facts I have aſſerted; he does not deny the deſcription I have given of the weakneſs of the enemy's camp, and of its lines and redoubts; of its

its numbers of men; of its truly diſtreſſed ſtate, ariſing from the want of comfortable lodgings, of proviſions, and of clothing; or of the conſtant deſertions, and extreme mortality raging among his troops. All theſe facts he gently glides over in ſilence, and artfully reſts his defence on the following naked aſſertion: That

Page 106.] "The author's plan of beſieging the enemy at the Valley Forge, is in the higheſt degree abſurd. Had I made a diviſion of the troops in the manner he propoſes, I ſhould have expoſed them to be beaten in detail."

Surely this cannot be deemed a ſatisfactory anſwer to thoſe numerous facts, ſhould I ſay nothing in reply; however, fatigued as I am with the diſagreeable taſk of refuting ſo many poſitive aſſertions, and ſuch numerous miſrepreſentations, I cannot paſs it over in ſilence. On my reader's account, as well as my own, I will be brief. The reader will ſee, in the Appendix, an extract of a genuine letter from a Committee of Congreſs, appointed to examine into the ſtate of Waſhington's army, and ſitting at the Valley Forge at the time I have mentioned. It is ſigned *Francis Dana*, one of the Committee, in behalf of the reſt, directed to the Preſident of the Congreſs, and indorſed in the hand-writing of Mr. Laurens, the then Preſident, from whoſe trunk, among other intereſting papers, it was taken; the authenticity therefore cannot be diſputed. From this letter, it will appear that I have been modeſt in my deſcription of the diſtreſſes of Waſhington's army; I truſt I have been ſo in every other piece of information which I have given; and I cannot help acknowledging, that I eſteem it a fortunate event, that I am thus juſtified in a particular which carried with it a greater degree of improbability than any other that I have communicated to the public.

Having peruſed this letter, the reader will recollect, that the General had under his immediate command

command near 20,000 veteran troops: that his enemy had not 3000 men, who could with propriety be called effectives; that these were in a manner deſtitute of almoſt every neceſſary; and that he had not horſes to carry off his cannon and military ſtores. What, then, could prevent the General from marching out with 5000 men, and attacking this enfeebled, ſickly, and naked enemy, thus deſtitute of proviſions? Was he afraid that 5000 veteran Britons would be beaten "in detail" *by ſuch an enemy?* Why, then, did he not take his whole army (as there was at that time no other body of men in arms on the whole continent of America), and attack, or ſurround, and ſtarve him into a ſurrender, agreeably to the plan I have mentioned in the Letters? Could any thing be more practicable? Did not every ſenſe of military duty, the recent loſs of the Northern army, and the critical ſtate of affairs at that time in Europe, all preſs him to take this meaſure? Had this been done, the honour of his country, ſhamefully loſt at Saratoga, would have been regained; all the valuable artillery, and military ſtores of the continent, would have fallen into his hands. The Congreſs, ſeeing their whole force taken or diſperſed, muſt have deſponded of further oppoſition; all America muſt have ſubmitted; and the Court of France muſt have ſeen the folly of its new alliance, and receded from it; and thus the General might have ſaved his country from all its preſent difficulties, embarraſſments, and diſtreſſes.

If there was not a want of inclination, why was not this done? The General cannot plead want of perfect knowledge of the ſtate of his enemy. If he wanted charts of Waſhington's quarters, and his redoubts and defences, ſeveral of them were brought in to him by men of credit, who took them on the ſpot. If he wanted intelligence of the ſtate, poſition, or movements of the army, he received it conſtantly from officers, and other perſons

ſons confidential in every department of the enemy's army; beſides his conſtant intelligence from deſerters, ſpies, and the people of the country, daily coming into his lines. In ſhort, there was no movement, or other material circumſtance that happened, but what the General was ſoon acquainted with. The ſtate and condition of the rebel army was as much before him as before Waſhington himſelf.

It has been a queſtion with many, what motives could lead an officer, whoſe reputation ſtood high in the opinion of his Sovereign and country, into all this miſconduct. The humane impute it to his real ignorance in his own profeſſion. But theſe men have taken only a ſuperficial view of his actions. His plans of the battle of *Long Iſland* and *Brandywine* are irreſiſtible proofs that, when he intended to gain an advantage over his enemy, or to cut off his retreat, he poſſeſſed military judgment ſufficient to inſure it. At both of theſe places, he knew, that if he had been defeated, he muſt have loſt his army. Had his troops been routed at Long Iſland, he could not have eſcaped to his ſhips, when purſued by a victorious enemy. Thus circumſtanced, his military abilities were exerted; nor would his manœuvres have diſgraced a general of the firſt abilities; he turned his enemy's left flank, unſuſpected, by a circuitous route, and killed and took priſoners one-third of his army. At Brandywine, when he thought his fleet had left him, and he had no ſafety but in victory, his meaſures were equally judicious; he ſuddenly, and unperceived, hemmed in the whole rebel army between his two columns and impaſſable waters. In ſhort, he was never defeated, nor compelled to retreat; and always ſucceeded in every attack he thought proper to make, as far as he choſe to ſucceed; knowledge, therefore, could not be wanting, whenever inclination called it into action.

There

There are others, who imagine the war was procraſtinated from lucrative views. But from this charge I acquit the General *.

There are others, who, having carefully examined *the conduct of the General in America*, and compared it with *the proceedings of a wicked faction in Britain*, are convinced that the deſign of both was *the ſame*; and that the General, inſtead of accepting the command with an intention to execute the truſt repoſed in him by his Sovereign and his country, accepted it *by the advice*, and *with deſign* to facilitate the wicked purpoſes, of his confederates in Britain. I ſincerely wiſh there were no ground for ſuch a concluſion. But there are circumſtances ſo ſtrong, and actions which ſpeak ſo loudly in ſupport of it, that, when examined, they will amount to poſitive proof. Indeed, it is impoſſible to trace his conduct, by fair and juſt arguments, from any other motive.

A private letter from Mr. Samuel Kirk, of Nottingham, one of the General's conſtituents and colleagues in faction, with his anſwer, is before the Public. Mr. Kirk charges him with a breach of promiſe, in accepting of the command of the forces about to be ſent to America *for ſuppreſſing the rebellion*; tells him of the "confuſion it had made among his friends;" gives his reaſons againſt it; and concludes with ſaying, "I do not wiſh you may fall, *as many do*, but I cannot ſay *I wiſh ſucceſs to the undertaking*." To this confidential and truly *ſeditious letter*, the General returns an anſwer as confidential. He tells Mr. Kirk, that "he had flattered himſelf he had removed all *thoſe prejudices* he had entertained againſt him;" "that he had been *highly complimented*, upon his accepting the command, by thoſe who are *averſe to the meaſures of Adminiſtration*;" and "intreats him in particular *to ſuſpend his judgment*, until

* The Editor of this Extract cannot. He fears, the enjoying his immenſe Appointment was one motive of his Delays.

the

the *event* ſhould prove him *unworthy* of his ſupport."

Theſe letters, which were not intended for the public eye, ſurely furniſh us with a clue to the dark and heinous conſpiracy of the Faction, with which the General was connected. From them it appears, that, before theſe men had concerted their plan of oppoſition, he had pledged his honour to his conſtituents, that he would not accept of a command which was to *ſuppreſs the rebellion*; and that notwithſtanding, he was led by ſome, we muſt ſuppoſe, powerful motive, to violate his promiſe.

What that motive was, is likewiſe ſufficiently evident. It was the advice of the men who were thus "*averſe to the meaſures of Adminiſtration*," whoſe "*compliments*" he immediately received on accepting the commiſſion; whoſe *approbation* he pleads as an excuſe for his breach of promiſe, to remove the "*prejudices*" of his particular friend, who had declared "he could not wiſh him ſucceſs" in *ſuppreſſing the rebellion*, and to induce him "*to ſuſpend his judgment*" on the General's conduct, "until the *event* ſhould prove him "*unworthy of his ſupport.*" Upon theſe plain facts the Public will determine, whether there is not ſatisfactory proof of a reſolution in the General to co-operate with the deſign of a Faction, who were averſe to that meaſure, a deſign as unconſtitutional as it was wicked; and which was nothing leſs than to wreſt from their Sovereign his conſtitutional right to appoint his confidential and executive ſervants (a right which, by the conſtitution of the Britiſh government, is as firmly eſtabliſhed in the Crown, as that of electing repreſentatives in Parliament is fixed in the People); to compel him to turn out the preſent Adminiſtration; and *to put his own perſon, his family, and his crown, into the hands of theſe conſpirators.*

To accompliſh this deſign, all their powers were to be united and exerted. One great line of conduct was to be adopted; Adminiſtration was to be pro-

proclaimed the authors of all the national misfortunes; and their meaſures, however honeſt, wiſe, or neceſſary to the honour and ſafety of the empire, were to be obſtructed in Parliament, and the execution of them defeated, if poſſible.

Men's actions are the ſtrongeſt proof of their ſecret deſigns. If we examine the conduct of the Faction in Britain, we find that it has ſtrictly correſponded with *theſe preconcerted meaſures.* The American rebellion was an event, which theſe men thought would furniſh them with all the means neceſſary to the accompliſhment of their deſign. They ſaw it would call for the exertions of Government, and that thoſe exertions would afford a large field for oppoſition. The real rebel, who wiſhed to overturn the government, and the hungry patriot, who could only be ſatisfied by power and places, united therefore in foſtering and ſupporting it. And, leſt the wiſdom of the rebel coloniſts ſhould fail in their plans, the meaſures of ſedition from time to time were concerted, and tranſmitted, by the Faction in Britain, to their confederates in America. "The non-importation agreement, the union of the colonies, and the meeting of a Congreſs; a ſolemn league and covenant, under oath, not to purchaſe the manufactures of Great Britain, and to make an *united and invincible ſtand againſt the Britiſh Government,*" were all meaſures which originated in Britain, and were adopted in America.

Whilſt theſe ſecret intrigues againſt the State were carrying on with the rebels in America, the meaſures of Government at home were loaded with the moſt opprobious epithets. The ſteps which were taken to ſupport the authority of the State over the Colonies, were called a "*cruel, tyrannous, and ruinous ſyſtem of policy.*" And thoſe which were adopted to ſubdue the moſt unjuſtifiable rebellion, were ſtyled "*an unjuſt and ruinous war.*" Every engine was in motion, and every ſeditious ſcribblers was employed to poiſon the minds of the people,

people, and to render the meaſures of Adminiſtration odious in the eyes of the nation. Thoſe miſrepreſentations and falſehoods, which they thought would moſt readily captivate the vulgar, were induſtriouſly propagated. The preſſes poured forth their pamphlets and occaſional pieces, to ſhew the diſtreſſed ſtate of the kingdom, the decreaſe of its inhabitants, the immenſe debt and poverty of the nation, the want of the reſources of war, the impoſſibility of raiſing the neceſſary aids, the lawfulneſs of American oppoſition, and the injuſtice and cruelty of the war; which, it was boldly aſſerted, was intended, by the councils in which their Sovereign immediately preſides, to introduce deſpotic power in the Colonies. Nor were theſe doctrines confined to Pamphlets and News-papers. They were the conſtant themes of inflammatory declamations in both Houſes of Parliament.

Having, by theſe ſeditious meaſures, raiſed the popular clamour againſt Government, and prevailed on a conſiderable part of the deluded people to ſupport them; having diſtracted the counſels of the State, and induced them to treat with rebels, and to offer to give up the moſt eſſential right of the ſupreme authority, *the right to tax thoſe Colonies which it was bound to protect*; they adviſed their colleagues in ſedition in America, to reject the propoſitions, as "*unreaſonable and inſidious.*" And theſe opprobrious epithets were tranſmitted from Weſtminſter to Philadelphia, and echoed back from the Congreſs to Weſtminſter again. And afterwards, when, through their private intrigues, they had ſacrificed the Northern Army, involved their country in a war with France, thrown the nation into a general deſpondency, and compelled Adminiſtration to offer to the rebels terms of accommodation, little ſhort of independence itſelf; their object not being as yet ſecured, their ambition ungratified, the loaves and fiſhes unobtained, and the firmneſs and virtue of their Sovereign not yet conquered, they dreaded

the proſpect of accommodation with America; and therefore adviſed the leaders in rebellion to reject even thoſe terms; aſſuring them, *that Adminiſtration could not ſupport the war, and that they muſt ſoon grant them independence.* How happy is it for Britain, that theſe ſeditious men were miſtaken, and that the Congreſs purſued this fooliſh advice! fooliſh in reſpect to the views of Congreſs, as well as thoſe of the Faction in Britain!

They weakly imagined, that his Majeſty, alarmed at the proſpect of a war with France, and of the loſs of America, would change his confidential ſervants, and receive into his boſom thoſe men who were the ſole authors of thoſe diſtreſſes; who, when in office, by their ſeditious counſels, had laid the foundation of the rebellion, and, through its whole progreſs, had encouraged and ſupported it; who had enjoyed the firſt offices of the State; and whoſe honour, integrity, and abilities, when weighed in the balance, had been found wanting; men who had avowedly oppoſed every meaſure which his Majeſty had wiſely projected to ſupport the authority of the State, and the independence of the nation.

But, finding that his Majeſty met all the diſtreſſes, which theſe conſpirators had brought on their country, with a virtuous firmneſs, which baffled their expectations, they determined to proceed to yet more inſolent and violent meaſures. They reſolved, in their ſecret cabals, to impeach his confidential ſervants, and by that means to wreſt them from his ſervice. Such impeachments were impudently threatened in the great council of the State. While they were thus bringing their plot to maturity in Britain; while the natural reſources of this country were cried down, to the great encouragement of our foreign enemies, and a national deſpondency in a manner effected; while the Faction was ſtrenuouſly adviſing, and zealouſly contending, in both Houſes of Parliament, for withdrawing the troops from America, and at the ſame time oppoſing every meaſure which was ne-

ceſſary

ceſſary for the recovery of the revolted Colonies; their arch-agent, the General, with honourable fidelity, was taking every ſtep to procraſtinate the war; to plunge the nation yet farther in debt, and a more general deſpondency; and to render Adminiſtration more odious to the people. We have ſeen, that, although by his "great ſucceſſes" obtained in leſs than four months, by only one half of his force, he "had nearly induced a general ſubmiſſion" of the rebels; yet, by his inaction, he procraſtinated the war during the ſpace of ſixteen months longer, and left the rebellion in more ſpirits than when he began his operations. He ſuffered his enemy, with leſs than 3500 men, to re-conquer a province which he had lately reduced;—he ſuffered that enemy to beſiege his whole army in its quarters;—he wantonly waſted the ſeaſon of military operations, giving his enemy time to recruit their reduced force. By various meaſures, he continually depreſſed the ſpirit of loyalty, and always declined to avail himſelf of its aſſiſtance. He alternately ſunk and revived the ſpirit of rebellion, always taking care not to reduce it. He often met his enfeebled enemy, and as often, with his vaſtly ſuperior force, retreated before it; and, with an unaccountable verſatility, adopted one plan after another, always chooſing that which was moſt *expenſive to the nation*, and *ruinous to the ſucceſs of his own operations*.

In addition to all this, with a ſtrict conſiſtency of deſign to waſte the public money—to render the nation tired of the American war, and hopeleſs of ſucceſs,—and to multiply the difficulties of Government in carrying it on; we have ſeen him, in proportion as his enemy's ſtrength and reſources decreaſed, conſtantly increaſe his *wanton, unneceſſary, and extravagant demands for more force*, until, conjunctly with his colleagues in faction at home, he had laid the foundation of a war with France and Spain. This done, he immediately reſigned.

That the Faction, or the General, incapable of feeling for the diſtreſſes of their country, intended to involve it in a miſchief of ſo great a magnitude, while it was embroiled in a war with its Colonies, I do not determine; although their inſatiable luſt for power, and the emoluments of office, with the general tenor of their conduct, might even juſtify ſuch a deciſion. However, this is evident, that, upon the General's arrival in Britain, with a large retinue of his confidential friends, who were to be the vindicators of his ſhameful conduct in America, the Faction received him in their arms, and boldly vindicated his conduct. Their force thus collected, they conceived that their plot was brought to its wiſhed-for maturity. They prepared for, and loudly threatened, impeachments and the block. But, previous to this meaſure, the whole cenſure and odium of the miſcarriages of the American war, of which they themſelves had been the authors, were to be caſt on the ſervants of the Crown. To effect this, anonymous charges againſt the General were carried into Parliament, and his character was to be vindicated in the great councils of the State, and no where elſe. In vain did the officers of Government, to whom he was alone accountable, declare, that they had no accuſations againſt him. Inſtead of petitioning their Sovereign for a Court-martial, the only proper court by which he could be tried, they inſtituted an unprecedented examination in the Houſe of Commons, under the pretence of *vindicating the General*, when their real deſign was to *condemn the conduct of Adminiſtration*, and to prepare the way for their threatened impeachments.

In this examination, they hoped to run alone. For a time they did ſo; but at length their ſecret deſign appearing evident, Adminiſtration was called on to vindicate the meaſures of their Sovereign. Many gentlemen of undoubted reputation, perfectly acquainted with the conduct of the war, and the ſtate of America, were ſummoned to give evi-

dence

dence reſpecting them. Of this the Faction was appriſed. Only two witneſſes were examined. But ſuch was the force of their evidence, that the Faction ſhrunk from the enquiry; the great council of the nation was convinced, that the conduct of Adminiſtration, in reſpect to the American war, ſtood clearly juſtified, and the deep-laid plot of the Faction was totally fruſtrated.

Such has been the conduct of the men, who, in exact imitation of their confederates in America, have, by their ſpecious and falſe clamours for liberty, been ſeducing their unwary country to the brink of ruin! And ſuch are the evils, in which they have, by their cabals, with unabating induſtry, involved the nation! When will Britons, the moſt wealthy, the moſt free, and the moſt happy people on earth, diſcern their own good! When will the voice of wiſdom teach them to ſupport thoſe meaſures, and that power, which alone can preſerve their freedom and independence among nations! When will they ceaſe to be the inſtruments of faction, and the unhappy dupes of lawleſs ambition!

Time has been, when the Princes on the throne have paid no regard to law, and broke over the ſacred bounds of their happy conſtitution; when they have deprived the worthieſt men, without law, of their perſonal liberty, and robbed the people of their property; and when they would have extended the prerogative to the utmoſt bounds of arbitrary power. How different, at this day, is the ſituation of Britons! They have a Sovereign, into whoſe heart a wiſh never yet entered that interfered with the happineſs of his ſubjects; who never yet received a farthing from his people without their conſent; who, inſtead of attempting to extend the prerogative, has, of his own accord, given up a part of that prerogative to ſecure the rights of his people;—a Sovereign, who, when the diſtreſſes ariſing from their own folly, lately compelled them to put unlimited power into his hands,

to ſave the capital city of their kingdom from immediate deſtruction, and the nation itſelf from ruin, exerciſed it with more than parental lenity; and, having complied with the wiſhes of the virtuous part of the nation, and ſaved his country from ruin, inſtantly, with a virtuous generoſity, gave it up;—a Sovereign, whoſe heart-felt wiſh, if we may judge from the whole tenor of his conduct, is, to preſerve their conſtitution of government inviolate, and to ſupport its *independence*, its *dignity* and *glory* among nations; to recover the loſt dominions of the State; and to reduce his faithleſs and perfidious enemies to juſtice; which there can be no doubt of his effecting, if not obſtructed by the folly of his people, and the ſeditious views of a Faction, which has too long diſtracted his counſels, and prevented the exertions of his power. And yet too many Britons, faſcinated by the ſpecious arts and deluſive wiles of thoſe political impoſtors, are conſtantly giving them their ſupport, in oppoſition to the truly patriot meaſures of their Sovereign; ſacrificing their own happineſs at the altar of lawleſs ambition, and precipitating the moſt powerful and beautiful fabric of civil liberty remaining on the globe, to its final ruin.

APPEN-

APPENDIX.

To Lieutenant General Sir WILLIAM HOWE, *K.B.*

SIR,

HAVING, in the preceding ſheets, travelled in much haſte through your laboured Defence, permit me to paſs from the diſagreeable office of an accuſer, to that of vindicating the accuſed. I hoped, that, as a gentleman, you would have followed, in your Obſervations, the example I had ſet you in my Letters; in which, with as much delicacy of language as truth would poſſibly admit, I had confined my ſtrictures to your "profeſſional conduct," without ſuffering one ſyllable of perſonal abuſe, or one hint at the defects in your private moral character, to eſcape from my pen. But in this hope I am diſappointed. Conſidering Mr. Galloway as the Author of "Letters to a Nobleman;" and wiſhing, by defaming his perſonal character, to leſſen his credit; and that the impoſitions on the Public, in your Defence, might more readily paſs for truths; you deſert the field of decent and manly argument, and take a mean refuge under the abuſe of his private reputation. A conduct of this kind can need no comment; it can have no weight with the candid; it is the uſual practice of the guilty, and the common weapon made uſe of to wound the innocent.

You do not venture to accuſe him of, although you ſtrongly inſinuate his diſloyalty:—You deny his influence in the province he lived in:—You boldly charge him with giving you falſe intelli-

gence;

gence; and you meanly condeſcend to boaſt of your liberality towards him. Now, although no man can perceive what relation theſe matters can have to a vindication of your "profeſſional conduct," I ſhall, on Mr. Galloway's account, examine them.

To give a gloſs to your inſinuations reſpecting his diſloyalty, you ſay: "This gentleman, in the beginning of the rebellion, was elected a Member of Congreſs." What, Sir, does this prove? It is well known, that many gentlemen, who had before, and have ſince, given the moſt demonſtrative proofs of their loyalty, were elected by the then conſtitutional Aſſemblies, and ſent to the firſt Congreſs, with the moſt laudable and loyal deſigns,—to accommodate the alarming controverſy, to eſtabliſh a more permanent union between the two countries, and to ſtop the riſing ſedition. This was exactly the circumſtance of that gentleman, who refuſed the delegation on any other terms. His inſtructions are long ſince before the Public, and prove the fact; and it is known to many gentlemen now in London, from Pennſylvania, that, while in Congreſs, he faithfully purſued thoſe Inſtructions, uniformly exerting his influence to carry them into execution. That he, boldly, and unawed by the dangers which threatened his perſon, in the tumults of riot and faction which he was oppoſing, condemned every meaſure which tended to ſedition, and a ſeparation of the two countries. That when he found he could not ſtem the torrent of rebellion, he returned to the Aſſembly; and there again, as the ultimate meaſure he could purſue, to ſave the province he lived in, he reſolutely exerted his influence to induce them to diſapprove of the meaſures of Congreſs, and totally to ſecede from all connexion with it. That having failed in this meaſure, on the queſtion, by one vote only, he was again elected a Member of the ſecond Congreſs, contrary to his own ſolemn and repeated refuſals to ſerve. That he continued thus elected until long after that Congreſs met; but as he did

not

not attend, another was elected in his room. And yet such was the earnest desire of the Congress to obtain his concurrence in their measures, that Doctor Franklin came up to his seat in the country, to which he had retired, to solicit his union with them, and offered to procure his immediate re-election; all which he resolutely refused. And afterwards, that, although his life was repeatedly threatened by the independent faction, and while his friends trembled for his safety, he, unawed by his danger, condemned in his publications the measures of Congress, and charged them with views of independence and treason, at a time when they publicly disavowed them. Could it be possible for the candour of the Public to ask for further proof of this gentleman's uniform fidelity to his Sovereign, and attachment to the legal constitution of his country; his having abandoned a very valuable estate, and sacrificed the independent happiness of his family to those principles, must certainly be that proof.

But you further add, "When my Brother and I, in the character of his Majesty's Commissioners for restoring peace, published a *proclamation of indemnity, for all those who had taken part in the rebellion*, provided they should surrender themselves, and subscribe a declaration of allegiance within a limited time, *Mr. Galloway was among the first who came over to us from* PHILADELPHIA;" thus intimating that he had taken part in the rebellion, and came to take the benefit of the pardon offered by the proclamation. Now, Sir, although this is all invention, I do not suspect it is your own. I wish, for the sake of your own character, to believe it to be that of your venal dependant, whom you have long since amply rewarded for writing your Vindication; for you know you was not, where you ought to have been, with your army at Brunswick, when Mr. Galloway came over to it, but in New York; and, should I descend to follow your example, of attacking

tacking private reputation, I could, perhaps, inform the Public what *allurement* led you thither. However, as this is a practice of which I diſapprove, I ſhall not adopt it. But, Sir, the real truth is—Your proclamation is dated 30th November, and was not publiſhed within your own lines at Brunſwick, in New Jerſey, near 60 miles diſtant from Philadelphia, from whence you ſay Mr. Galloway came, until the day following; and on this very day, early in the morning, he was within your lines, with General Vaughan, in Brunſwick. Driven from his family, by an order of the Convention at Philadelphia for the impriſonment of his perſon, he left Pennſylvania on the 28th, two days before the date of your proclamation, and eleven days before one of them was ſent to the province he left; for you may recollect, that thoſe proclamations were not ſent to Pennſylvania until after your arrival at Trenton, on the 8th of December, when your Aid de Camp requeſted Mr. Galloway to ſend fifty of them to Philadelphia; which he accordingly did, by a perſon on whom he could depend. I have mentioned General Vaughan, who may recollect the time of Mr. Galloway's coming into Brunſwick, and that he was the firſt who ſhewed him the proclamation. Thus, Sir, you will perceive into what a dilemma you have brought yourſelf, by truſting to the invention of one who was with you at New York, and could know nothing about the time when Mr. Galloway came over to your lines. But, if you really thought Mr. Galloway "had taken part in the rebellion," why did you afterwards appoint him to ſo many places of high truſt in his Majeſty's ſervice, giving him an opportunity daily to betray it? How can you account for a conduct, ſo inconſiſtent with your manifeſt duty, either to your Sovereign or Country?

You next meanly deſcend to mention your liberality to Mr. Galloway. Mean, indeed, it will appear, when that gentleman's ſervices and ſacri-

fices

fices are conſidered, had it flowed from your private purſe; and yet meaner ſtill, when it is known you paid it out of the public money. And how much did this profuſe liberality amount to? No more than 770l. in which the wages of a clerk are included, by your own account, for ſervices performed during 18 months.

And what were the ſervices he performed? He acted as Superintendant of the Police, which he digeſted, regulated, and eſtabliſhed, at your requeſt. In this office was included the preſervation of the order, internal peace, and ſafety of the firſt city in America. He ſerved you as Superintendant of the Port; an office eſtabliſhed to receive an account of all the cargoes imported for the uſe of your army, and the people within your lines, and to prevent their being clandeſtinely carried to the enemy. He ſerved you as Superintendant of the prohibited Articles. In this office the utmoſt care and attention was neceſſary, to prevent the enemy from being ſupplied with them. He alſo ſuperintended every avenue of your lines, and nightly received the reports of perſons appointed to attend them. He was conſtantly employed by you, from the time of your arrival at the head of Elk, to the day of your reſignation, in obtaining for you intelligence of the ſtate and movements of the enemy; and gained more important and better intelligence for leſs than 500l. than you paid for at New York, as your friends confeſſed, upwards of 5000l. He was often applied to by the Commiſſaries and Quarter-maſters, for his advice and aſſiſtance in procuring forage and proviſions for your army. He was inceſſantly called on to furniſh you with guides and horſes for your parties. He raiſed a troop of light horſe; and embodied eighty loyal volunteers, who ſerved without pay or clothing; performing, under his own direction, thoſe many and uncommon ſervices mentioned in a note of his Examination, page 80. He alſo furniſhed you with many maps,

delineating

delineating the roads for the march of your army; and a principal one, with all the roads between the Delaware and the Suſquehannah, either drawn by himſelf, or under his immediate direction; with a variety of other ſervices, totally independent of his public offices; which, had they been done by your favourite officers, would have coſt you ten times the amount of the whole ſum of your profuſe liberality to him. Such are the ſervices of Mr. Galloway, which you have not had the honour to mention. Your liberality, and thoſe ſervices, are now before the Public, to whoſe candid reflections both are ſubmitted. I ſhall only remark, that, had you dealt out the public money, committed to your charge, with the ſame œconomy to your favourites, as you did to this gentleman, we ſhould not have ſeen ſo many American Nabobs rolling in wealth, and luxuriouſly living on the ſpoils of their country, as have lately returned from America.

In reſpect to Mr. Galloway's popularity in the provinces in which he had lived, it is too well aſcertained by a variety of facts too notorious to be affected by your negation; but as the charge of his want of influence does not injure his moral character, I ſhall ſay no more on that ſubject.

Of a very different nature is your next and laſt charge. You ſay, "You at firſt paid attention to his opinions, and relied upon him for procuring you ſecret intelligence; but you afterwards found your confidence miſplaced; his ideas you diſcovered to be viſionary; and his intelligence was either ill-founded, or ſo frequently exaggerated, that it would not have been ſafe to act upon it." If theſe aſſertions be truths, why did you continue conſtantly to employ him in the line of intelligence, to the day of your reſignation? Why was your Aid de Camp almoſt daily coming down from you to him, deſiring him to ſend out for intelligence? Why did you not altogether rely on your "other channels of ſecret communication?" How unaccountable

countable then muſt it appear to men of ſenſe, that you ſhould be ſo weak as to continue to truſt a perſon, whoſe "ideas you had diſcovered to be viſionary," and whoſe "intelligence to be ill-founded, exaggerated," and falſe?

But you further add, "Having once detected him in ſending me a piece of intelligence from a perſon, who afterwards, upon examination, gave a very different account of the matter, I immediately changed the channel of ſecret communication, and, in future, conſidered Mr. Galloway as a nugatory informer." How dark and unmanly is this charge! Againſt charges ſo general, ſo perfectly undefined, and ſo artfully made, it is impoſſible for the moſt innocent perſon to vindicate himſelf; for you have prudently avoided either mentioning the perſon who "gave a very different account of the matter," or the matter itſelf. Can you believe, that this ſtab in the dark, at a private character, will not be condemned by the candour of the Public? It will ſoon, Sir, appear, that, to the laſt hour of your command, you entertained a high opinion of Mr. Galloway's honour and probity. Did you at the time, or during your command in America, give him the leaſt hint of your ſuſpecting the intelligence he ſent you? Had you done this, he would, in all probability, have convinced you that he did not deſerve your ſuſpicion, if, in reality, you ever entertained one; he might have convinced you of his having received the intelligence from the perſon who denied it, and that this perſon had deceived you. This would not, Sir, have been the only inſtance in which you were deceived.

However, dark and inſidious as this charge is, it is fortunate for Mr. Galloway, that there is proof abundantly ſufficient to convince the unprejudiced, that all you have aſſerted reſpecting his diſloyalty, his unpopularity, and deception, is of recent invention, and had no exiſtence in your mind when you left America; it is proof which you yourſelf will not deny the credit of, being no leſs than the teſti-

mony of Sir William Howe himſelf, under his own hand, and the ſeal of his arms.

Six days only before you left Philadelphia, impreſſed with the faithful ſervices of Mr. Galloway, you not only warmly recommended him to the attention of your ſucceſſor, but wrote to him the following letter:

"Sir, *Philadelphia, May* 18, 1778.

"THE *ſalutary effects* of the regulations in the eſtabliſhment of the police in this city, have ſo fully juſtified my choice of the gentlemen in whoſe hands I placed the *important truſt*, that I cannot, *either as a public* or *private man*, withhold *this teſtimony of my ſenſe of their ſervices*; and I beg, that, to the *general reſpect paid you*, as an *upright, able magiſtrate*, and *friend to the legal conſtitution of your country*, I may be permitted the honour of adding *my particular aſſurance of the great perſonal eſteem* with which I am, Sir,

Your moſt obedient humble ſervant,

W. HOWE."

Joſeph Galloway, Eſquire.

Now, Sir, permit me to aſk:—If Mr. Galloway was *diſloyal*, how could you give him your teſtimony that he was "a *friend to the legal conſtitution of his country?*" If he was *unpopular*, how could he poſſeſs "*the general reſpect as an upright magiſtrate?*" If he had *deceived you*, in giving you falſe intelligence, why could you not very juſtly, "*either as a public or private man, withhold your ſenſe of his ſervices?*" And, if he was *unworthy of your confidence*, how *unworthy* was it in Sir William Howe to give him *particular aſſurances of his great perſonal eſteem?* Theſe are paradoxes which we muſt leave to be unfolded in your next attempt to vindicate your conduct in the American war.

Such was your opinion of Mr. Galloway when you left America, and ſuch it continued to be for

ſome

ſome time in England; for you was the firſt gentleman, your own and your Noble Brother's Secretaries excepted, who paid him the honour of a viſit on his arrival in London. Nor was it changed the day before his examination in the Houſe of Commons, on the conduct of the American war; for you well remember, that, on that day, your Noble Brother, who was pleading in your defence, and therefore we may preſume ſpoke your ſentiments, delivered, when Mr. Galloway was preſent, an high, though fulſome panegyric on his honour and integrity. But how changeable are the good opinions of men! Mr. Galloway being examined, the film which had before inverted his Lordſhip's optics, and repreſented Mr. Galloway as a man of integrity, became ſuddenly removed; and from that inſtant he ſtood metamorphoſed from an honourable man into "Shakeſpear's apothecary;" and now, by the ſame magical influence, you have transformed him from a man worthy of "general reſpect as an upright magiſtrate," into one of no *popularity;* from an *upright man*, into *a deceiver;* and from a "friend to the legal conſtitution of his country," into *a rebel.*

November 10, 1780.

THE AUTHOR.

Sir,

I cannot eaſily deſcribe the diſcontent and diſappointment which appears among a very great number of your conſtituents here, on account of your having accepted a *command in the expedition againſt our American brethren.* From the opinion I had of your integrity in general, I voted for you at the late election, notwithſtanding you had, in ſome recent inſtances, acted contrary to my ſentiments. I took the liberty to tell you ſo, and aſked you the following queſtions, viz.

Whether you thought our whole army would not be inſufficient *to conquer America?*

If you did not think *the Miniſtry had puſhed this matter too far?*

Whether, if you ſhould be appointed to a command, you would refuſe? And,

Whether you would vote for the repeal of the four Acts of Parliament, which *you are now going to enforce?*

If I am not miſtaken, and I believe that you will allow that I am not, *you anſwered to every one of theſe Queries in the affirmative.* This, out of pure regard to your intereſt here, I have made known to *numbers*, who were in the ſame ſtate of ſuſpenſe with myſelf, as to the propriety of our conduct at the election; and it has ſerved to remove, in a great meaſure, the ill *impreſſions*, by which you yourſelf was *very ſenſibly* affected while among us.

We are however aſſured, that General Howe is preparing to embark *for America to enforce the Acts. Judge, if you can, the confuſion this occaſions among your friends.* The moſt plauſible excuſe that is made among us, is, that the King ſent for you, and what could you do?

Now I muſt beg leave to ſay, that I think you might have acted the part of *a great man, in refuſing to go againſt this people* on many accounts. But to ſay nothing of politics, your Brother died there. They have ſhewn their gratitude to your name and family, by erecting a monument to him, who bled in the cauſe of freedom amongſt them; to him, who dared to act *in oppoſition to a Court*, when his judgment informed him his oppoſition was right; and yet he died a ſoldier. Our paſſions were wrought upon at the election by the mention of his honoured name, in a paper which you may perhaps remember; and may I not mention it to you, with a wiſh that you may *follow* ſo amiable, ſo diſintereſted, ſo revered a character? I believe you have not even an enemy, who would impute *your refuſing to go*, to want of courage; nay, your courage would be made more *conſpicuous by the refuſal.*

If you ſhould reſolve, *at all events, to go*, I do not wiſh *you may fall*, as many do: but *I cannot ſay I wiſh ſucceſs to the undertaking.* Theſe, Sir, are the ſentiments of many here, as well as of

Your obedient ſervant,

Nottingham,
Feb. 10, 1775. SAMUEL KIRK.

Sir,

I have read your letter of the 10th, with ſo much the greater degree of concern, as I had flattered myſelf I had *removed all thoſe prejudices you had entertained againſt me*, when I had the pleaſure of being with you at the election. The rancour and malice of thoſe who were not my friends at the election, fill me with aſtoniſhment at the inſtance you mention of their wiſhes for my fall in America.

My going thither was not my ſeeking. I was ordered, and could not refuſe, without incurring the odious name of backwardneſs to ſerve my country in diſtreſs.—So contrary are *men's opinions here*, to ſome with you, that, inſtead of the groſſeſt abuſe, I have been *moſt highly complimented upon the occaſion, by thoſe who are even averſe to the meaſures of Adminiſtration.*

Every man's private feelings ought to give way to the ſervice of the Public at all times; but particularly, when of that *delicate nature* in which our affairs ſtand at preſent. Whatever opprobrious names I may be called at Nottingham, I am encouraged to ſay, that no ſuch epithets will be put on it in *any other quarter.* I intreat *you in particular*, to ſuſpend your judgment *in thoſe matters, until the event proves me unworthy of your ſupport.*

One word for America: you are deceived, if you ſuppoſe there are not *many loyal and peaceable ſub-*

jects in that country. I may ſafely aſſert, that the inſurgents are very few, in compariſon of the whole people.

There are certainly thoſe who do not agree to a taxation from hence, but who do not wiſh to ſever themſelves from the ſupremacy of this country. This laſt ſet of men, I ſhould hope, by their being relieved from *the grievance*, will moſt readily return to all due obedience to the laws.

With reſpect to *the few*, who, I am told, deſire to ſeparate themſelves from the Mother Country, I truſt, when they find they are not ſupported in their frantic ideas by the more moderate, which I have deſcribed, they will, from fear of puniſhment, ſubſide to the laws.

With regard to trade, this country muſt now fix the foundation of its ſtability with America, by procuring a laſting obedience to our laws, without which it can never arrive at that permanency ſo abſolutely requiſite for the well being of this empire.

I am, Sir, your faithful and obedient ſervant,

Queen Street, Feb. 21, 1775. WILLIAM HOWE.

An Extract of a Letter from the Committee of Congreſs to the Preſident, found among the Papers of HENRY LAURENS, *Eſq.*

Sir, *Camp at Valley Forge, Feb.* 12, 1778.

WHEN, in compliance with the expectations of Congreſs, and the wiſhes of the country, the army was thrown into huts, inſtead of retiring to more diſtant and convenient quarters, the troops juſtly expected every comfort which the ſurrounding country

country could afford. Among theſe, a providential care in the *article of ſtraw*, would probably have ſaved the lives of many of your brave ſoldiers, who have now paid the great debt of nature. *Unprovided with this, or materials to raiſe them from the cold and wet earth, ſickneſs and mortality have ſpread through their quarters in an aſtoniſhing degree. Notwithſtanding the diligence of the phyſicians and ſurgeons, of whom we hear no complaint, the ſick and dead liſt has increaſed one-third in the laſt week's returns, which was one third greater than the week preceding; and, from the preſent inclement weather, will probably increaſe in a much greater proportion.*—*Nothing, Sir, can equal their ſufferings,* except the patience and fortitude with which *the faithful part of the army* endured them. *Thoſe of a different character deſert in conſiderable numbers.*

The want of *horſes and waggons* for the *ordinary as well as extraordinary occaſions of the army,* preſſes upon us, if poſſible, with equal force; almoſt every ſpecies of camp-tranſportation is now performed *by men, who, without a murmur, patiently yoke themſelves to little carriages of their own making, or load their wood and proviſions on their own backs*—*Should the enemy, encouraged by the growing weakneſs of your troops, be led to make a ſucceſsful impreſſion upon your camp, your artillery would now undoubtedly fall into their hands, for want of horſes to remove it.*—But theſe are ſmaller and tolerable evils, when compared with the imminent danger of your troops, *periſhing with famine, or diſperſing in ſearch of food.* The Commiſſaries, in addition to their ſupplies of live cattle, which are precarious, have found a quantity of pork in New Jerſey, of which, *by a failure of waggons, not one barrel has reached the camp.*

The orders were given for that purpoſe as early *as the 4th of January.*—In yeſterday's conference with the General, he informed us, that *ſome brigades had been four days without meat; and that even the common ſoldiers had been at his quarters to make known their wants.*—At preſent, Sir, there is not one

gentleman

gentleman of any rank in this department, though the duties of the office require a conſtant and unremitted attention. In whatever view, therefore, the object preſents itſelf, we truſt you will diſcern, that the moſt eſſential intereſts are connected with it. The ſeaſon of preparation for next campaign, is paſſing ſwiftly away. Be aſſured, Sir, that its operations will be ineffectual, either *for offence or protection*, if an arrangement is not immediately made, and the *moſt vigorous exertions* uſed to procure the neceſſary ſupplies.

We are, with the greateſt regard and reſpect,

SIR,

Your moſt obedient, and

very humble ſervants,

(THE COMMITTEE.)

Signed FRA. DANA.

To the Preſident of Congreſs.

FINIS.

A LETTER

From the Rev. Mr. WESLEY *to a Friend, concerning a Paſſage in a Monthly Review.*

Dear Sir,

YESTERDAY looking over the Monthly Review for laſt October, at page 307, I read the following words:

"Sir *William's* Vindication" (of his own conduct) "is *not a feeble attempt* to reſcue his reputation from the obloquy thrown upon it. Mr. *Galloway's* Book is here anſwered, Paragraph by paragraph, and ſeveral miſrepreſentations of important facts and circumſtances proved."

I cannot quite agree with this. I think, 1. No unjuſt obloquy has been thrown upon it: 2. That his Vindication is *a very feeble attempt*, to juſtify his conduct: 3. That he has not anſwered in a ſatisfactory manner, any one paragraph of Mr. *Galloway's* Book: and, 4. That he has not proved any miſrepreſentation of any one important fact or circumſtance.

I think alſo, that the account he gives of Mr. *Galloway* is *a very feeble attempt* to blacken his character:

racter: for a full confutation whereof, I refer the candid Reader to the preceding Appendix. As to the *ſcurrility* Sir William ſpeaks of, I ſee not the leaſt trace of it in any thing Mr. G——— has publiſhed. He is above it. He is no "*venal* inſtrument of Calumny:" he abhors Calumny as he does Rebellion.

I am, dear Sir, yours, &c.

City Road,
Jan. 25, 1781. JOHN WESLEY.

P. S. I have been frequently attacked by the Monthly Reviewers, but did not anſwer, becauſe we were not on even ground. But that difficulty is now over. Whatever they object in their Monthly Review, I can anſwer in my Monthly Magazine. And I ſhall think it my duty ſo to do, when the objection is of any importance.